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1  ABSTRACT 
Human and Organizational Factors account for eighty percent (80%) of high 
consequence accidents in engineered systems (Bea 2001).  To achieve high quality 
in the lifecycle of increasingly complex engineered systems, it is imperative that 
we assess and manage the risks attributed to human and organizational factors 
of the system. A key step in mitigating these risks is to capture and build on the 
knowledge gained from previous experience.  To this end, a repository of Best 
Practices and Lessons Learned (BP/LL) that is stored for efficient future recall is 
proposed.  By learning what has and has not worked in the past, project planners 
with little experience can more proactively manage the risk inherent in complex 
engineered systems and ultimately achieve higher quality. 
 
Unfortunately, a repository alone will not suffice.  There needs to be a method 
for capturing and sharing information; the technology that supports the transfer 
of the BP/LL needs to facilitate storage and retrieval; those that contribute to the 
repository must be recognized as the experts in the field; the content of the 
repository must be relevant and up-to-date.  The philosophical base of 
Knowledge Management attempts to address these issues.  The US Navy and, 
subsequently, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) have adopted 
the principles of KM to facilitate the transfer of BP/LL.  
 
This project explores the development of a tool that captures BP/LL regarding 
the risks involved in the operation of the Underwater Construction Teams.  This 
tool aids the operator in assessing risk using the principles of Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) while planning a project using the UCT Project Planner.  
The report also identifies the need for a tool that captures BP/LL regarding 
quality in an updated version of the UCT Project Planner.  The content review 
process of the BP/LL and the storage and accessibility considerations for the 
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material is discussed in light of the philosophies of knowledge management and 
the advantages of collecting knowledge in this framework are discussed.  Finally, 
recommendations are made regarding the formal establishment of the 
Underwater Construction Community of Practice (UC CoP) and the further 
development and implementation of the upgrade to the UCT Project Planner.   
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2. Quality and Reliability 
2.1. Quality 
Most organizations strive to achieve "quality" in their product.  The term 
quality, however, means different things to different people.  It could refer 
to workmanship, the material used, price or a number of other items or, 
more likely, a combination of definitions.   Whatever the product a firm 
produces, it is important to define the attributes of quality.  Bea (Bea, 2001) 
defines quality with the following attributes (Figure 1): 
Figure 1 - Quality Attributes (Bea 2001) 
 
Compatibility - The product is on time, on budget and does not have any 
unnecessary or negative impacts on the environment and society. 
 
Serviceability - The product is fit for its intended purpose.  The guarantee 
the system is used for the agreed purpose and under the agreed 
conditions of use. 
 
Safety - The freedom from undesirable or hazardous situations.  The 













Durability - The freedom from unanticipated degradation in the safety, 
serviceability or compatibility of the system. 
 
Quality is the freedom from unanticipated defects in the compatibility, 
serviceability, safety, and durability of the designed system. 
2.2. Reliability 
Closely linked with quality is reliability.  Bea (Bea 2001) defines reliability 
(Ps) as the probability that a given level of quality will be achieved during 
the lifecycle of the system. The lifecycle is defined as the conception, 
design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of the 
system.  A reliable system has acceptable safety, serviceability, 
compatibility and durability throughout the lifecycle.    
 
Failure to achieve any one of the quality attributes will lead to failure of 
the system.  As the demands (D) on a system become greater with respect 
to the capacities (C), the system is more likely to fail.  See Figure 2. 
Equation 1 
Pf = 1 - Ps = P(D>C) 
Figure 2 - Probability of Failure given Capacity (C) 
and Demand (D) 
D 








Pf = P[D>=C] 
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Bea goes on to point out that failure in a system develops from intrinsic or 
extrinsic causes.  Intrinsic causes include factors such as extreme 
environmental conditions and other uncertainties.  Extrinsic causes are 
due to Human and Organizational Factors.  
  
Bea contends that eighty (80) percent of high consequence accidents are 
due to Human and Organizational Factors (See Figure 3).  These failures 
are linked back to operator error in the design, construction, operation 
and/or maintenance phases of the system.  While the operator may be at 
the "root" of the problem, the errors can be and often are caused or 
compounded by error inducing influences from organizations, equipment, 
the structure, procedures, environments (internal and external) and the 
interfaces between all of these. 
Figure 3 - High Consequence accidents (Bea 2001) 
 
If we let the following be true: 



























I = intrinsic factors 
E= Extrinsic factors,  
then the probability of failure of the system to develop quality attribute (i), 
is 
Equation 2 
P(FSi) = P(FSiI U FSiE) 
Where P(FSiI) is the failure of one of the quality attributes due to the 
randomness of intrinsic events and P(FSiE) is the probability of failure of 
one of the quality attributes due to Human error.  So, 
 
Equation 3 
P(FSi) = P(FSiI|ESi)P(ESi) + P(FSiI|ESi)P(ESi) + P(FSiE|ESi)P(ESi) 
Where, 
P(ESi) = probability of no Human and Organizational Errors, and 
P(A|B) indicates the probability of occurrence of A conditional on the 
occurrence of B. 
 
The first term in Equation 3 means the probability of failure of the 
attribute due to an intrinsic event given a human error.  In other words, 
the loads (demands) on the system were miscalculated.  The second term 
means that the failure in the attribute was due to some unforeseen 
intrinsic event. The third term means that the failure of the attribute was 
due directly to human error. 
2.3. Human and Organizational Factors 
2.3.1. Human Performance 
Bea (2001) cites J.H. Stamler's definition of HOE as being "a deviation from 
acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an individual (human error) 
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or group of individuals (organizational error) that can result in an 
unanticipated and/or undesirable result." 
 
To define how human errors 
occur, Bea (2001) looked to 
the work of Rasmussen 
(knowledge, rule and skill 
based behavior) and James 
Reason (Evaluation, Goal 
Setting and Execution) to 
illustrate the thought 
pathways as illustrated in 
Figure 4.  The figure is 
valuable in that it 
demonstrates for each level 
of cognition there is a series 
of steps that need to be taken.  The more practiced one becomes in a 
particular task, the responses will move from knowledge based to rule 
based and eventually to skill based. As this happens shortcuts are 
developed in the cognitive process and reaction to given situations 
becomes almost automatic. 
 
1. Knowledge based - Knowledge based performance requires a great 
deal of thought.  There are no previously established models from 
which to work. This means that the thought process requires all of the 
individual's attention.  "Errors at this level originate from resource 
limitations (attention, cognition and or time) and incomplete or 
incorrect knowledge." (Bea, 2001) 
 

























2. Rule based - This is the next level in the cognitive process.  The 
individual calls on previously developed thought patterns for a given 
situation.  These thought patterns are developed through training and 
experience.  "Solutions are selected automatically, but conscious 
thought is used to verify that the solution is appropriate."(Blumenberg, 
1996)  The types of errors in rule-based behavior are that the rule does 
not fit the situation or that it could be recalled incorrectly. 
 
3. Skill based - This level of the cognitive process requires the least 
cognitive effort of all.  Skill based behavior is developed through 
repeated recall of the actions needed to perform the task that they are 
automatic.  Driving a car is a good example of skill-based behavior. 
 
Bea points out that mishaps happen because of Errors as defined by 
Reason and violations as defined by Dougherty.  See Table 1. 
 







Skill based  Slips and Lapses Erroneous or unintended 
Rule-based Rule Based mistakes Routine 




Errors are committed by accident where violations are committed on 
purpose.  This does not mean that violations are performed with intent to 
harm.  Lapses are defined as errors that result from a failure in the storage 
of the action plan and slips are errors in execution. 
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2.3.2. Organizational Performance 
In the study of organizations, Bea (2001) cites the work of a large number 
of people in the study of High Reliability Organizations (HRO).  The 
attributes associated with HROs are the following: 
 
Migrating decision making - The recognition that the people at the top of 
the wire diagram of an organization are not the ones that make the key 
operational decisions in the time of crisis.  The organization pushes the 
authority to the lowest level possible, however the responsibility to 
properly train the operators remains with the organization. 
 
Redundancy - The system does not rely on the skills or attributes of just 
one entity.  
 
Procedures and rules - The guidelines in which operations are run are 
clear, concise, and not overly complicated. 
 
Training - The organization provides operators and management in 
training of scenarios that are normal, abnormal and unbelievable.  The 
purpose is to develop rule and skill based behavior in those that operate 
and manage the system. 
 
Appropriate awards and punishments - The organization has integrity.  
What it says and what it does are in sync and the reward and punishment 
system is based on the furtherance of the organization's goals or the 
failure to do so. 
 
Management's ability to see the big picture - Management is continuously 
checking the heading of the organization to ensure its words (policy and 
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procedures) and its actions (operations) are in line and heading in a safe 
and reliable direction. 
   
Preoccupation with failure - Instead of worrying about what it will take to 
succeed the HRO determines what success is and then spends its time 
trying to identify the obstacles that keep the organization from achieving 
success.  Once identified the organization works to eliminate or side step 
the obstacle.  Once all the obstacles are identified, the organization may 
also redefine success to make it achievable. 
   
Culture - Appropriate awards and punishments listed above falls under 
this category.  To reiterate, the organization is consistently concerned with 
increasing the reliability and safety of its system.  The culture is not part of 
just management or just the operators, but is instilled throughout the 
organization. 
 
Sensitivity to operations - The organization realizes that its output is a 
function of its frontline, the operators.  All policies and procedures are 
developed to increase the reliability of the operators.  The safety and 
welfare of the operators is the organization's top priority. 
 
2.3.3. Human and Organizational Errors and Malfunctions  
An engineered system as defined by Bea (2001) is made up of 
organizations, operators, procedures, hardware and structures, 
environment and the interfaces between them.  The types of errors or 
malfunctions for each of these components of an engineered system, again 
cited by Bea (2001), are listed below in Table 2.   
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Table 2 - Errors types for the components of an engineered system (Bea 2001) 
Operator Organization Procedure Environment Hardware and Structure 
Communications - 
Ineffective transmission of 
information 
Communications Incorrect - faulty Internal 
Serviceability - Inability to 
satisfy purposes for 
intended conditions 




values and trust 
Inaccurate - 
untrue External 
Safety - excessive threat of 
harm to life, demands 
exceed capacities 







Durability - occurrence of 
unexpected maintenance 
and less that expected 
useful life 
Ignorance - unaware or 
unlearned Ignorance 
Excessive 
complexity   
Compatibility - 
unacceptable schedule, 
budget or finished product 
Planning and Prep - lack of 
sufficient program, 




organized   
Selection and Training - 
not suited, educated or 










documented   
Limitations and 
Impairment - excessively 
fatigued, stressed and 











   




diagnosis and action 
Mistakes    
 
Figure 5 is included to give an indication of how often errors could occur 
in a system.  Table 3 is a list of Performance shaping factors.  These 
performance-shaping factors will have an impact on the rates at which 
humans will make errors.  
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Table 3 - Performance shaping Factors (Bea 2001) 
Error Producing 
Conditions 
Multiplier Error Producing Conditions Multiplier 
Unfamiliarity 17 Time shortage 11 
Low signal to noise ratio 10 Features over-ride allowed 9 
Spatial/functional 
incompatibility 
8 Design model mismatch 8 
Irreversible action 8 Information Overload 6 
Technique unlearning 6 Knowledge Transfer 5.5 
Performance Ambiguity 5 Misperception of risk 4 
Poor feedback 4 Inexperience 3 
Communication Filtering 3 Inadequate Checking 3 
Objectives Conflicts 3 Limited diversity 2.5 
Educational mismatch 2 Dangerous incentives 2 
Lack of exercise 1.8 Unreliable instruments 1.6 
Absolute judgements 1.6 Unclear allocation of functions 1.6 
Lack of progress tracking 1.4 Limited physical capabilities 1.4 
Emotional Stress 1.3 Sleep cycle disruption 1.2 






























































The point of showing Figure 5 and Table 3 is to provide a quantitative 
base to see where and how often errors are likely to occur.  The goal is to 
reduce the likelihood of error in the system and increase the chances of 
achieving quality.  Bea defines quality as the Compatibility, Durability, 
Serviceability, and Safety of a system.  These quality characteristics can be 
applied to any part of the lifecycle of an engineered system to include 
design, construction, maintenance and operation, and decommissioning. 
 
2.4. Summary 
When one considers there are four quality attributes, five major 
components of the lifecycle, eight types of operator errors, it is easy to see 
how Human factors can have serious impacts on the engineered system.  
The problem is compounded when we consider the affects of the 
environment, procedures, organization, equipment and the structure on 
the operator.  As stated earlier, it is approximated that 80% of the 
significant engineering failures are due to Human and Organizational 
Factors.  If one could reduce the probability of Human and Organizational 
errors, the likelihood of sufficient quality will increase.  Further, if one 
understands that Human error is inevitable, than the system can be 
designed with the idea that humans will be constructing, operating and 
maintaining the system. 
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3. Risk Assessment and Management 
3.1. Risk Assessment and Management 
Bea (2001) defines risk as the product of the likelihood of an event and the 
consequences of the event.  Risk assessment is the evaluation of the 
sources, effects and consequences of risks.  Risk Management "attacks 
both the likelihood of compromises in quality and the consequences 
associated with those compromises."  There are three ways in which to 
manage risk: 
 
1. Proactive Risk Management- Identifying and mitigating the knowable 
or predictable risks or hazards in a system.  
  
2. Reactive Risk Management - The process of analyzing failures or near 
misses of a system, determine the cause and implement measures to 
prevent future failures of the system.  
 
3. Interactive Risk Management - This is the real time evaluation and 
subsequent intervention with a system to return it to a safe condition. 
 
It is the author's contention that these phases of risk management are 
applicable at different levels.  For a particular task, the risks involved in 
that task can be planned proactively, influenced interactively, and, once 
the task is complete, remedied reactively.  The process does not and 
should not stop here.  Proper analysis, documentation and storage for 
efficient retrieval of the interactive and reactive risks encountered and 
mitigated is the most valuable tool to proactively manage risks on similar 
or related tasks in the future.  A Best Practices/Lessons Learned 
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knowledge base that identifies hazards encountered in the past and what 
was done to decrease the risk would be very useful in analyzing and 
mitigating risk proactively.   Without a repository of information we must 
rely on these four elements to evaluate potential errors: 
 
Judgement - This requires experience with the system in general being 
studied combined with an understanding and sensitivity to the 
peculiarities of the specific system being studied.  There are many experts 
in the military who have sound judgement in a variety of different fields.  
Over the course of an assignment, an individual will gain a thorough 
understanding of his job and for all intents and purposes is an expert.  
When that person transfers, he takes his expertise with him.    Given the 
transitory nature of Military however that  expertise is not always readily 
available and the judgement must be made by someone with less 
experience. 
 
Simulation - This is an attempt to replicate the conditions that will impact 
the system and see where potential errors could occur.  The purpose 
would be to train the operators how to handle potential systemic 
problems.   
 
Experiments - Experiments in different activities involved in a system, 
could be helpful in pointing out potential errors in a system.  Care should 
be taken though in that studying only part of a system will not give 
insight into the interfaces of the system as a whole. 
 
Process Review - The study of what went wrong in the past is a key 
element in determining what could go wrong in the future. Especially in a 
high-risk environment, an insight into the stresses and pressures that 
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existed and their causes will guide an organization in the development of 
proper mitigation of the causes. 
 
Risk assessment and management involves a step-by-step process 
whether it is done proactively, interactively or reactively.  The Joint 
Australian/ New Zealand Standard on Risk Management provides the 
following flow chart on the analysis and Management of risk.  See 
Appendix A. 
 
It is important to consider the application of this flow chart will be 
dependent on the time one has to implement them.  It is obvious that 
proactive risk management will be the most thorough as one will have 
sufficient time to plan and train to mitigate the risk.  An important part of 
this process is to consider the successful and unsuccessful attempts to 
manage risk on similar projects and/or similar environments in the past. 
This is the key to detection and mitigation of possible errors in the future.  
Unfortunately, this thought process is not currently emphasized.  
Interactive risk management is done on the spot.  Training will work 
towards developing the skills to respond under pressure and stress to 
save the quality of a system interactively.  
 
3.2. Operational Risk Management: The Navy and Marine Corps Solution 
In 1997 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps (CMC) put out a joint instruction OPNAVINST 
3500.39A/MCO 3500.27A ordering the use of Operational Risk 
Management in the Navy and Marine Corps.  The Navy and Marine 
Corps adopted ORM because, "Historically, the greater percentage of 
losses during combat operations was due to mishaps."  (OPNAVINST 
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3500.39A) And, "Unnecessary losses either in battle or during training are 
detrimental to operational capability." (OPNAVINST 3500.39A)  









Mishaps 56% 44% 54% 75% 
Friendly Fire 1% 1% 1% 5% 
Enemy Action 43% 55% 45% 20% 
 
3.2.1. How ORM is Organized 
The Naval Safety Center's web site has a very good explanation of ORM 
and how it works.  The "handout" breaks ORM down into the following 
principles, levels and steps: 
 
3.2.1.1. Principles in Applying ORM 
1. Accept Risk when the Benefit is greater than the risk. 
- Risk is part of military action; all risk cannot be eliminated 
2. Accept no unnecessary risk. 
- An unnecessary risk does not contribute to the mission and the 
outcome is not foreseeable 
3. Anticipate and manage risk by planning. 
- Proactive planning provides more time and resources to manage risk 
4. Make risk decisions at the right level. 
- If risk is greater than the benefit or help is needed to implement 
controls, communicate with higher authority. 
3.2.1.2. Three levels of Applying ORM 
1. Time Critical ORM 
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- In combat or in situations where risk must be assessed and 
managed interactively or reactively, there will not be time record 
decisions on paper. 
2. Deliberate ORM 
- Risk Management that is done proactively, when the resources of 
the command can be leveraged against the risk. 
3. In-depth ORM 
- Long-term risk management used for "complex operations, 
introduction of new equipment, tactics or training curricula." 
3.2.1.3. Five Steps in Applying ORM 
1. Identify Hazards 
- Determine the activities involved in the operation 
- Identify the hazards involved in the activities 
2. Assess Hazards and Determine Risk 
- Determine the probability or likelihood a hazard will happen 
- Determine the severity or consequences if the hazard happens 
- Use the following matrix to determine level of risk: 
Table 5 - Risk Assessment Code Matrix (Naval Safety Center Web Site) 
Mishap Probability  
RAC Matrix 
Likely Probably May Unlikely 
Critical 1 1 2 3 
Serious 1 2 3 4 




Minor 3 4 5 5 
 
3. Make Risk Decisions 
- Develop controls to decrease the likelihood or the consequences or 
both. 
- Start with the most serious hazards first 
- Reassess risk if controls are put in place 
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- Communicate with higher authority if the risk is still greater than 
the benefit 
4. Implement Controls 
- Standard Operating Procedures, Orders, briefs, training and 
rehearsals. 
5. Supervise 
- Ensure tasks are being performed to standard 
- Watch out for changes that require interactive intervention. 
 
ORM is valuable in that it provides Sailors and Marines with a step-by-
step way to manage risk both on the job and in their off time.  The process 
slows people down so that they think of the consequences of what they 
are doing before they act.  It is also structured in such a way that it is easy 
to perform a risk analysis "on the fly." 
 
3.2.2. ORM is Great, But… 
ORM is a great step in managing mishaps, but it can be perceived 
negatively.  The Navy and Marine Corps policy is that risk management is 
to be performed in all day-to-day operations.  The training examples used 
are often very simplistic.  While this is necessary, to complete the training 
in a short amount of time, it subverts the power of the lessons being 
taught and loses credibility not only with the sailors and marines but with 
their leaders as well.  A Navy Lieutenant Commander commented on how 
he saw ORM implemented in the planning of a Change of Command and 
one of the risks was that one of the attendees may trip on the carpet 
walking to the podium.  While it is easy to argue that doing an ORM 
analysis on a command event is good training on the ORM process, 
identification of such "hazards" makes ORM seem trivial.  These examples 
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are fuel for a cynics fire.  And, with an organization as large as the Navy 
and Marine Corps, there are bound to be many cynics. 
 
If the projects have multiple risks, (as do most projects worth doing a risk- 
analysis on) which risk should take priority?  If a Seabee construction 
project has 10 activities (which would be a very small project), and each 
activity has three to five potential hazards there are 30 to 50 hazards to be 
analyzed.  This certainly is a significant administrative burden to the 
planners to keep track of all the hazards and prioritize them.  ORM 
becomes one more item on the "things-to-do" pile and may not receive the 
attention it needs.   
  
In grooming tomorrow's leaders today, it is necessary to place young 
Sailors and Marines in positions of increased responsibility.  If part of this 
responsibility is planning the execution of a task, could we reasonably 
expect them to appreciate the task's inherent risks or its subtleties?  As 
discussed earlier, without supporting information on a task, judgement is 
used to determine risk.  Can we expect these young Sailors and Marines to 
have the requisite experience to make judgments on the tasks they are to 
work on?  Also, as shown in Table 3, a Performance Shaping Factor of 17 
is assigned for unfamiliarity, a PSF of 11 for time shortage, a PSF of four 
for misperception of risk 4, and a PSF of 3 for inexperience.  These 
performance-shaping factors are influences that can result in an increase 
in the mean rates of human errors (Bea, 2001).  Obviously, an increase in 
the rate of human errors means a decrease in reliability and quality and an 
increase in risk.   
3.2.3. Step 6: Review Controls 
To proactively manage risk effectively in the future it is necessary to 
capitalize on the Lesson's Learned from the past.  To this end a sixth step 
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is proposed for ORM.  The step is to review the controls that were put in 
place to mitigate the risks.  Those involved in the task must determine if 
the controls worked or not.  If they worked, indicate that they worked and 
make any further recommendations for the future.  If they did not work, 
why and what could be done in the future to improve the risk? 
3.3. The Engineered System Approach 
When developing controls to be put in place, it is necessary to look at the 
problem as a whole not the individual parts.  The Safety Center's Handout 
cites the following as causes of mishaps: 
 
Individual failure.  Marine knows and is trained to standard but elects not 
to follow the standard (self-discipline). 
 
Support Failure.  Equipment/material improperly designed or not 
provided. 
 
Leader Failure.  Leader does not enforce known standard. 
 
Training Failure.  Marine not trained to known standard (insufficient, 
incorrect, or no training on task). 
 
Standards Failure.  Standards/procedures not clear or practical or do not 
exist. 
 
As stated earlier the engineered system as defined by Bea (Bea, 2001) 








Operators - the individuals performing a given task. 
Organization - The group responsible for the operators or for whom the 
operator is performing the work. 
Procedures - The written and unwritten methods of performing a task. 
Environment - The external environment considers weather, noise, etc. 
while the internal environment has to do with the emotional state of the 
operator. 
Structure - The structure on which the operator is working.  
Hardware - The equipment that is being used by the operators in the 
performance of the task. 
Interfaces - The links between each of the categories listed above. 
  
This taxonomy is intended to provide the "hows" of errors (Bea,2001).  
Comparing the two lists of mishap causes, it is clear that they are very 
similar: Individual error and Operator error; Leadership error and 







Organizational error; Support error and Structures and Hardware 
(Equipment) error; Standards error and Procedural error.   
 
In addition to those just cited, Bea also includes two additional categories.  
These are environmental influences and the interfaces between all of these 
elements.  The environment will always play an important role in the 
performance of any task and it would be a mistake to not consider it.  The 
interfaces between the other categories are also significant.  A particular 
category alone may not cause a significant risk but the interface with 
another category could have dire consequences.  As for the training error 
cited on the Naval Safety Center's web sit, that could be a failure of the 
operator in that he is not educated or practiced for the activity or a failure 
of the organization in not providing the operator with the proper training. 
  
Looking back at Table 2 we start to see the reason for errors for each of the 
categories.  It is unreasonable to expect sailors and marines to remember 
these tables, but it would be helpful when performing a risk analysis to 
consider these items.  Addressing the items in Table 2 will help better 
implement controls to decrease the risk involved in a task. 
3.4. Proposed Tools 
3.4.1. Risk Assessment and Management Tool 
A database that allows a user to input the major activities and the hazards 
associated with those activities would be useful in decreasing the 
administrative burden to the operators.  Obviously, this will only be 
useful for deliberate or in-depth Operational Risk Management. The 
database can be organized to walk the user through the steps of ORM, 
reminding him of the principles.  This tool will produce a prioritized list 
of hazards associated with a project and will walk the user through the 
different issues to consider in order to implement the most thorough and 
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effective controls.  Finally, the tool can be used to review the controls used 
to mitigate the risks as to how well they worked and what could be done 
in the future to improve risk.   
3.4.2. Lessons Learned Repository 
A Lessons Learned knowledge base that identifies hazards encountered in 
the past and what was done to decrease the risk would be very useful in 
analyzing and mitigating risk proactively.  Until now, the tools necessary 
to capture what we learned, store the information and access that 
information for future use is lacking.  The practice of Knowledge 
Management strives to address these issues and will be discussed in detail 
later. 
3.4.3. Tool Considerations 
It is important to consider the organization that will be using the tool 
being constructed.  No one tool will be used universally.  Instead, a 
particular tool must be configured to meet the needs of the immediate 
organization.  If the users do not feel the tool meets their needs, they will 
be less inclined to use it. 
 
Another consideration is that the tool cannot add work to an already full 
In-box.  If the tool requires additional effort, the people it was intended for 
won’t use it.   
 
There are certainly other issues to be considered and they will be 
addressed later in the report as the tools are discussed in greater detail.  
The intent of this report is to look at the US Navy's Underwater 
Construction Teams and what can be done to help the UCT's manage risk 
in their operations.  Before these tools can be described it is necessary to 
 25 
study how the organization works.  The Underwater Construction Teams 
are outlined in Chapter 4. 
3.5. Summary 
Risk Assessment and Management is key to keeping the operators that 
work on and with engineered systems safe and increasing the probability 
of a quality project.  The Navy and Marine Corps have developed a 
system to facilitate the process of risk assessment for Sailors and Marines.  
It is a solid program, but adds a significant workload to the operators, 
requires a simplistic training program to teach the fundamentals of ORM 
which in turn subverts the importance of the exercise.  Finally, ORM 
requires Sailors and Marines to use their judgement on the risks involved 
with tasks with which they may not be very familiar.    The Engineered 
system was introduced and offered as a way to add context to risk 
assessment and determine where significant hazards lie.  Two tools were 
proposed that would aid sailors and marines in the performance of risk 
assessment.  The first is a database that will look at each of the activities of 
an operation and the hazards associated with those activities.  The second 
is a repository of Best Practices and Lessons Learned to capture what 
others have learned in the past to build on successes and improve on 




The US Navy has two Underwater Construction Teams, UCT ONE in Little 
Creek, VA and UCT TWO in Port Hueneme, CA. Their mission is  
 
…to perform complex in-shore and deep ocean underwater facility life-
cycle management in any climate to meet Navy, Marine Corps or Joint 
Force operational requirements. The UCTs are a specially trained and 
equipped unit that provides underwater engineering, construction, repair 
and inspections capabilities.  
 
In short, "if a task has to deal with facilities that are located anywhere on or 
seaward of the beach, the Navy's UCTs are probably involved." (Balk et al., 
1998)   
 
The Underwater Construction Teams were formally established in 1973 and 
commissioned into service in 1974, although Seabee Divers have existed 
since WWII.  These specially trained divers were attached to the Mobile 
Construction Battalions and took on projects such as underwater demolition 
of reef obstructions, and in-shore construction necessary for development of 
channels, harbors, and mooring facilities for the fleet.  During the same 
period, several small, semi-independent units were being formed to perform 
combat underwater demolition, limited salvage, and underwater 
construction. These units were the predecessors of the Underwater 
Demolition Teams, and originally included SEABEE divers who were led by 
Civil Engineer Corps Officers.  (Balk et al. 1998) 
 
During the Vietnam War, diving SEABEEs served with the NMCBs 
deployed to Southeast Asia.  Their primary tasks included repair of war-
damaged waterfront facilities, and construction of bridges, piers, and POL 
(petroleum, oils and lubricants) facilities.  Because they were often the only 
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diving personnel available, they also performed small boat salvage 
operations and security inspection swims on bridges, piers, and underwater 
fuel lines. (Balk et al, 1998) 
 
In support of its wartime mission, the US Navy assigned its Underwater 
Construction Teams Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) and Potential 
Operational Environments (POEs).  The Underwater Construction Team 
must be prepared to apply their ROCs in any of the POEs.  
4.1. Organization 
4.1.1. Chain of Command 
Appendix B shows the Chain of Command in which the Underwater 
Construction Teams fall.  The UCTs currently report directly to Brigade 
for their operational tasking.  There are a number of other entities that 
provide support to the UCTs and are important to discuss. 
 
The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the employment of all 
Naval Forces world-wide.  To this end, the CNO establishes each unit's 
mission and what their ROCs and POEs are.  Both the Pacific and Atlantic 
Fleets have divisions of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 
PACDIV and LANTDIV.  The Commanders of each of these divisions are 
also the Commanders of the Naval Construction Brigades.  
 
The Naval Construction Brigades divide the responsibility of Seabee 
employment between the Atlantic and the Pacific.  There is one 
Underwater Construction Team per coast.  The Brigades are the 
coordination points for commands that would like to have Seabees work 
on projects.  In the past, the Brigades have been less involved in the 
employment of the UCTs, but have taken a much more active role of late. 
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The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is responsible for 
the planning, design, construction, maintenance and repair of Naval 
facilities worldwide.  NAVFAC's areas of expertise are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6 - NAVFAC's areas of expertise 
• Base Development, Planning, and 
Design  
• Military Construction  
• Public Works  
• Utilities & Energy Services  
• Base Realignment and Closure  
• Environmental Programs  
• Weight Handling  
• Military Operations and 
Contingency Engineering  
• Acquisition  
• Real Estate  
• Family & Bachelor Housing  
• Ocean Engineering  
• Transportation Planning & 
Management  
 
The Engineering Innovation Criteria Office (EICO) is a headquarters field 
office that reports directly to the NAVFAC Chief Engineer and is the 
primary transfer mechanism for engineering and architectural knowledge 
to the Command and our contractors. EICO consists of a highly qualified 
staff of engineers and architects, all professionally registered, and all 
capable of providing technical guidance associated with facilities design, 
construction, and maintenance criteria.  Their job is to provide 
management, direction, coordination, and oversight for the search, 
assessment, development, and pursuit of innovative products and services 
throughout the NAVFAC. They interface with the fleets, major claimants, 
program offices, NAVFACHQ, Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs), 
Engineering Field Activities (EFAs), Public Work Centers (PWCs), Naval 
Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), other activities and 
LANTDIV divisions to gather, evaluate and promote innovative 
possibilities. (http://criteria.navfac.navy.mil/criteria/) 
 
Also part of NAVFAC is the Seabee Logistics Center at Construction 
Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.  The Center is tasked with the 
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ensuring Seabee commands like the UCTs are properly outfitted to 
perform their wartime mission.  This involves making sure the Table of 
Allowance for each command is complete and up to date. 
 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC) was established 
in 1993 to consolidate the missions of six components of the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command.  These components are listed in Table 7. 
Table 7 - NFESC's competencies 
• Ocean Facilities 
• Environmental Engineering 
• Amphibious and Expeditionary 
Logistics 
• Shore Facilities 
• Energy and Utilities 
• Visual Media Center 
 
 
The Ocean Facilities Department (Code ESC50) is "responsible for 
developing, improving and implementing the Navy's capability to plan, 
design, construct, inspect, maintain, repair and dispose of ocean facilities."  
The programs are included in Table 8. 
Table 8 - NFESC's Ocean Facilities Department's programs 
• Marine Geotechniques 
• Anchor Systems 
• Mooring Systems 
• Underwater Cable Facilities 
• Ocean Structures 
• Ocean Construction 
• Magnetic Silencing Facilities 
• Underwater Inspection 
• Coastal Facilities 
• Pipeline Integrity 
• Hyperbaric Facilities 
 
The Naval Construction Regiments provide training primarily for the 
Naval Mobile Construction Battalions.  The UCTs are able to "piggy back" 
on the training provided to the Battalions to fulfill their mission.  It is the 
UCTs' responsibility to adapt their schedule to fit that of the Regiments.  
20th NCR is located in Gulfport, Mississippi while UCT ONE is located in 
Little Creek, Virginia.  As a result, UCT ONE does not do a lot, if any, 
training with the regiment.  UCT TWO, however, is on the same base as 
the 31st NCR, which facilitates the interface between the two commands.  
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In short the UCTs are responsible for conducting or coordinating their 
own training. 
 
The Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center (NDSTC) is the US Navy's 
diving training center.  The Seabees that belong to the UCTs go through 
this school for First and Second Class Dive school and also the advanced 
and basic underwater construction curriculums.  The Underwater 
construction curriculum is included as part of the Ocean Facilities 
Program. 
4.1.2. Underwater Construction Teams 
The UCTs have grown considerably since they were commissioned in 
1974.  The command position is now a Commanding Officer rather than 
an Officer in Charge.  Each UCT has a slightly different manning as seen 
in Table 9. 
Table 9 - UCT ONE and TWO manning 
UCT ONE UCT TWO 
Sea 
3 Officers 
42 Enlisted Seabee divers (basic and 
advanced) 
4 Diving Medical Technicians 
Shore 




Current Manning = 62 
 
Sea 
4 Officers (one is a Diving Medical 
Officer)  
42 Enlisted Seabee divers (basic and 
advanced) 
4 Diving Medical Technicians 
Shore 




Current Manning = 60 personnel 
 
Both teams are significantly undermanned.  What's more, the Fleet 
Manning Document is being reviewed to increase the billets for each team 
to around 100 personnel.  This number is justified in the mission of the 
UCTs and their operational tempo. The teams are divided up into sea and 
shore contingents.  The Sea contingent consists of the SEABEES that deploy 
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to carry out the Command's mission.  It is made up of three Air 
Detachments (Air Dets) Alfa, Bravo and Charlie.  Air Detachments, each 
with 15 enlisted SEABEE divers, typically deploy 6 months out of the year.  
Each is similar in capability and composition, and is fully capable to carry 
out all of the UCT mission areas. Each air detachment is normally headed 
by a Chief Petty Officer, who has spent considerable time in the UCTs, is 
Dive Supervisor qualified, SCWS (SEABEE Warfare Combat Specialist) 
designated, and has completed a rigorous training and evaluation 
program. 
 
The shore contingent organizes the operations training and maintenance 
operations of the team.  They consistently work to ensure the logistical 
needs of the Air Detachments are met.  This requires a great deal of 
advanced planning and work.  The personnel that comprise the shore 
contingent are mostly SEABEE divers with some non-diver and non- 
SEABEE personnel as well.  
4.1.3. Ocean Facilities Program 
The Navy's Ocean Facilities Program (OFP) is managed within NFESC.  
The OFP is made up of the UCTs, NFESC's Ocean Facilities Department 
and the Underwater Construction Training School at NDSTC.  The OFP 
manages the personnel, engineering/technology base and the ocean 
construction equipment. Their service and support capabilities are listed 






Table 10 - OFP's service and support capabilities 
Specialized service capabilities 
include: 
Specialized support capabilities 
include: 
• Underwater inspection of waterfront 
facilities and mooring systems 
• Waterfront repairs 
• Pipeline inspection and assessment 
• Precision underwater blasting  
• Oceanographic surveys  
• Coastal engineering  
• Specialized anchoring and anchor 
systems  
• Arctic and cold water diving and 
support capabilities 
• Diving  
• Amphibious and support craft  
• Remotely operated underwater 
vehicles (ROVs)  
• Ocean construction support platforms  
• Deep ocean simulation pressure 
vessels 
• Site survey tools  
• Fiber optic and submarine cable test 
facilities 
• An extensive Ocean Construction 
Equipment Inventory (OCEI) of 
other specialized tools and 
equipment. 
 
NFESC provides support to the UCTs through the OFP.  This is not to say 
that the OFP's sole responsibility is to the UCTs.  Also, the Officer in 
Charge of the Ocean Facilities Program is not in the Chain of Command of 
the Underwater Construction Teams.  The UCT School at NDSTC does not 
fall in the Chain of Command of the OFP director either.  However, all 
these entities work together to advance the mission of the Navy's Ocean 
Facilities Program.  The Navy's OFP is a very small community.  Most 
people that have been in the program for a while know most of the others 
in the program.  The Seabee divers that make up the teams rotate between 
NFESC, the Underwater Construction school in Panama City, and the 
UCTs both Sea and Shore.  It is not unusual for a person to be attached to 
one of the teams for 10 or more years just rotating between the sea and 
shore components. 
4.1.4. Funding 
The funding to directly and indirectly support the UCTs comes in 
different ways.  
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Table of Allowance - The Table of Allowance is the tools and equipment a 
command has assigned to them to fulfill their war time mission.  The 
funds for purchasing new TOA comes through NAVFAC and goes to the 
Seabee Logistics Center in Port Hueneme. 
  
OPTAR - This is money (about $500,000 each) allocated to the UCTs 
through the respective Fleets.  It is sent through the Brigades and is for the 
operation and maintenance of the UCTs.  The funds for the re-
capitalization of the Table of Allowance are sent through the Brigades as 
well.  This is an important issue because unlike the Mobile Construction 
Battalions, the UCTs deploy with and use the same equipment in 
peacetime that would be used in wartime.  Obviously this equipment 
undergoes significant wear and tear.  For the UCTs to be fully operational, 
they need the re-capitalization funds. 
 
Project Support - Money is provided from various customers to the teams 
through the Brigades on a reimbursable basis to execute projects.  As the 
team purchases material or makes travel plans they cite the line of 
accounting provided by the customers. 
 
OCEI Equipment - NFESC receives $275,000 Other Procurement Navy 
(OPN) to buy and maintain the equipment for the Ocean Construction 
Equipment Inventory (OCEI).  This material is available to be loaned out 
on a short or long term basis to the UCTs, NFESC or other entities that 
may have a need. 
 
Support - NFESC also receives $300,000 Operation and Maintenance Navy 
(OMN) funds to support the UCTs and maintain the OCEI.  $220,000 pays 
for the contract personnel that maintain and inventory the equipment at 
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the OCEI facility among other things.  $80,000 is intended to be used for 
support to the UCTs.  The support comes in the form of planning, design, 
research and development, etc.   
 
Year end Dump - These are funds that are left over at the end of the fiscal 
year.  If a department has a need to be fulfilled, money that has not been 
obligated that will expire on 30 September can be sent to fulfill the need.  
This money cannot be guaranteed.  Usually a good, executable plan stands 
a good chance of being funded. 
 
The amounts of money that each source receives is budgeted a number of 
years in advance.  If a new need is discovered, there is a large amount of 
documentation needed to support an increase in the budget.  The 
documentation needs to indicate a need to support the war-fighting 
mission.  An example of this is the requirement for a bottom survey 
system to support the installation of Elevated Causeways (LCAS).  LCAS 
are installed by Amphibious Construction Battalions (ACB) to facilitate 
ship-to-shore offload of materials and equipment in the littorals.  The 
LCAS require piles to be driven in the ocean floor.  Currently the UCTs 
take borings of the bottom, but these only give the composition of one 
spot.  A number of these borings are taken, but the picture is not complete.  
A number of times, the ACBs started driving piles in less than optimal 
places which delays the off load of the ships. As a result a need has been 
identified for a sub bottom survey system that will use sound to 
determine the make up of the sea floor.  The operational importance of 
this is obvious, yet the additional funding needed for the research 
development, testing and evaluation has been difficult to come by. 
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4.2. Operators 
4.2.1. Underwater Construction Team Personnel 
The personnel that man the UCTs are mostly Seabees that have been 
specially trained in SCUBA and surface supplied diving at the Naval 
Diving and Salvage Training Center (NDSTC) in Panama City, Florida.  
These personnel are typically smart, physically fit, highly motivated and 
resourceful.  The Seabee's motto is "Can Do."  The Seabee Divers are the 
Can Do of the Can Do. Their training starts with Second Class Diving 
School.  Diving school is followed by a nine-week course in the basic 
underwater construction also at NDSTC. Successful completion of the 
basic underwater construction course merits award of the NEC 5932.   
After completing three to four years at a Team, UCT personnel have the 
opportunity to go to First Class dive School at NDSTC.  This course is 
followed up with the Advanced Underwater Construction course, which 
awards the NEC 5931. After many years of successful performance, a 
skilled Seabee diver may apply to become a Master Diver. 
4.2.2. Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center Personnel 
The Ocean Facilities Department at NFESC has about 90 people 45 of 
which are engineers.  The disciplines are varied (Ocean, civil, mechanical, 
electrical, etc.) but all are related to work in the oceans.  Of the 45 
engineers it is approximated that eight of them are divers.  As the Navy's 
Ocean Engineering expertise, the range of their experience is broad.  The 
average number of years of experience in the field is 15.  The engineers are 
very willing to work with the UCT personnel, but are somewhat limited 
by funding constraints.  As pointed out earlier, $80,000 per year is 




How the UCTs operate and, subsequently, how they train is based on 
their mission and the ROCs and POEs imposed on them in fulfilling that 
mission.   The deployment cycle for each UCT is the same in that they go 
through a maintenance phase, a training phase and a deployment phase.  
Each phase is six months long.  How each team executes the deployment 
cycle is different, however.  UCT ONE deploys primarily between April 
and September.  Air Dets Alfa and Bravo will have six months of training 
(October through March) and six months deployed.  During this time Air 
Det Charlie is in a heavy maintenance phase and is considered the "ready 
Det."  When the year is over, Air Det Bravo becomes the "ready Det" and 
Air Dets Alfa and Charlie deploy and soon.  UCT TWO has one Air Det in 
one of the three phases all the time, i.e. Alfa is in maintenance, Bravo is in 
Training and Charlie is deployed and every six months it rotates.   
4.3.1. Maintenance  
The maintenance phase is the first phase of the cycle. This is not to say 
that maintenance is only done during this phase.  Obviously the tools and 
equipment the divers use is maintained throughout the deployment cycle.  
The heavy duty maintenance is done during this phase.  Maintenance of 
the tools and equipment is extremely important in UCT operations. The 
equipment not only helps the divers do their job, but also keeps them 
alive.  The types of activities done during this phase are: 
 
Certification of the systems - These are certifications that ensure the teams 




Preventive Maintenance - Preventive maintenance is done to keep 
equipment in good working order.  The piece of equipment can still be 
used, but is more prone to failure due to the lack of maintenance. 
 
Corrective Maintenance - Something has gone wrong with a piece of 
equipment and it needs to be fixed.  The piece of equipment cannot be 
used until this problem is fixed. 
 
Re-capitalization of the Table of Allowance (TOA) - This involves 
identifying and reordering equipment that is part of the unit's Table of 
Allowance.  This could involve a piece of equipment that was lost or that 
was broken and is beyond repair. 
4.3.2. Training 
As stated earlier the UCTs are responsible for conducting their own 
training.  Given the adverse conditions they work in and the vast 
operational capabilities they are required to maintain including defensive 
military operations, training is significant in preparing the UCTs on their 
mission.  Some of the training is conducted at the UCT while some of the 
training the divers must be sent to different schools such as the school in 
Panama City.  The different types of training include: 
 
Diver Training (JQR)  - These are regulations that are designed by both 
UCTs that specify the training requirements for UCT personnel.  These are 
in accordance with the Navy Diving Manual, Revision four. 
 
Military Training and Seabee Combat Warfare Specialist (SCWS) training - 
The UCTs have a military mission as well as a construction mission.  The 
skills need to be retrained every year.  The SCWS program is the warfare 
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qualification for Seabees.  It demonstrates professionalism and is a 
requirement for advancement. 
 
Job Specific Training - This is training that is geared toward a specific job 
that the Air Det will be doing on their next deployment. 
 
Project development - While this is not technically a training item, it is 
done during the training phase to prepare the Air Det for its upcoming 
deployment.  Project development will indicate what job specific training 
is needed.  This is also where a good deal of the logistics are being 
determined for upcoming deployments. 
 
Project planning - Again this is not a training item, but is important in the 
execution of projects while deployed.  This is the mapping of how the 
project will progress from start to finish.  This is also a key step in 
determining the job specific training that will be needed during the 
deployment.  This is where the Dets develop a schedule based on the 
activities required to accomplish the project and do their deliberate 
Operational Risk Management.  The UCTs have an MS-Access based 
project planner to help facilitate the planning of jobs.  Both project 
development and project planning are overseen by the Operations 
Department. 
4.3.3. Deployment 
The execution phase of the deployment cycle is the deployment itself.  
During a deployment, an Air Det will do approximately six different jobs 
all in different parts of the world.  For instance, a diverse deployment 
schedule beginning in March may find UCT TWO members participating 
in Joint Fleet Exercises, repairs to earthquake damage at a Naval wharf, 
inspection and maintenance repairs in Alaska, Washington, Japan, Korea, 
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Hawaii, the Far Eastern Pacific, or along the California coast. This wide 
area of coverage keeps the Operations and Logistics Officers busy tracking 
the progress of the various jobs, and anticipating the logistical 
requirements as the Detachments move from site to site. (Balk et al, 1998)  
The days are long and the pace is furious.  When a Det Officer in Charge is 
not working on a project he is planning on how to get to the next project 
and worrying about the status of the material and equipment. 
 
The areas that make up the deployment phase are: 
 
Mobility - This is the moving of people, equipment and materials from 
homeport to the deployment site and then from one deployment site to 
the next.  Each team has different mobility issues.  UCT One Air Dets 
typically go back to headquarters after they finish each job.  UCT Two, 
however, will deploy and then return 6 months later.  Each scenario has 
its own challenges. 
 
Execution (Exercises and Projects) - This is where the UCTs "make their 
money."  This is what the maintenance, training, development and 
planning have been about.  The Dets do the work that has been planned 
throughout the training and maintenance phases.  The deployment is 
where the operators get the most experience in dealing with real situations 
and adapting to change.  The most valuable lessons are learned and best 
practices developed during the execution phase.  The Dets also learn if the 
controls they put in place to help decrease the risks work or don't work 
and what could have been done or should be done in the future to make 
the project go smoother.  As the Dets are deployed, they report back to the 
operations department on their progress on a biweekly basis.   
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Logistics - This includes funding, berthing, work space, meals, equipment 
receiving, etc..  Each deployment and each project on that deployment will 
have its own challenges. 
 
Training - The Dets will give safety lectures and perform training while 
deployed to keeps their military, diving and construction skills honed. 
 
Maintenance - As mentioned earlier, maintenance does not stop.  
Preventive maintenance must be performed to keep tools and equipment 
in top operating condition. 
4.3.4. Information Sources 
4.3.4.1. Manuals 
To give the teams a place to start, they use manuals that were compiled 
based on their ROCs and POEs.  Some, but not all, are listed below: 
 
US Navy Diving Manual, Revision 4 
The Diving Manual is produced by Naval Sea Systems Command and 
provides diving guidance for all diving operations in the Navy.  This is 
the primary manual from which Dives are planned. 
 
NAVFAC P-990 Conventional Underwater Repair Techniques Manual 
This manual is written by NFESC and the OFP and is "intended to be a 
guide for UCT personnel when conducting conventional operations." The 
basis of this manual are the Required Operational Capabilities put forth 
by the CNO.  The substance of the manual has been developed through 
field experience and by referring to other manuals.  Chapter seven of the 
manual has an extensive list of references. 
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Other manuals that UCTs use as a reference are the NAVFAC P-991 
Expedient Repair Techniques Manual, NAVFAC P-992 UCT Arctic 
Operations manual and numerous other operation and maintenance 
manuals for tools and equipment. 
 
4.3.4.2. Past Experience 
While the manuals are a good starting point for the UCTs, they typically 
rely on in-house experience to plan and execute their jobs.  As stated 
earlier, the personnel in the UCT can spend much of their career at one 
team.  The feeling is that there is someone in the team that has some 
experience in a task that has been performed before.  
 
4.3.4.3. Area Experts 
While the teams primarily try to plan and execute jobs on their own, 
sometimes they need help from the experts in a particular field.  The 
teams try plan the jobs as much as they can on their own, because they 
will not have the experts to count on in a time of war.  These experts, as 
previously discussed, are at NFESC. The teams are very good about 
asking these folks for help.   
 
4.4. Structures 
The UCTs work on a variety of different types of structures pier and cable 
inspections; repairs to piers, pilings, and cables; maintenance and 
construction of underwater discharge out-falls; support of amphibious 
operations; and participation in naval amphibious exercises. 
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4.5. Equipment 
4.5.1. Table of Allowance 
The teams are outfitted with a Table of Allowance (TOA) based on their 
Mission and ROCs and POEs.  This includes underwater tools, Civil 
Engineering support Equipment (CESE), weapons, dive gear, diving 
platforms, transportable recompression chambers, etc..  
4.5.2. Ocean Construction Equipment Inventory 
The OCEI is maintained by the OFP and is Ocean Construction Equipment 
that is used by NFESC or the UCTs that is not part of the UCT TOA. The 
OCEI contains over 100 major items or systems of loan-able specialized 
equipment and facilities components.  
  
The Ocean Construction Support Facility, which manages and maintains 
the OCEI is located at St. Juliens Creek Annex in Portsmouth, Virginia. 
This equipment is available for loan on a cost recovery basis to other Navy 
and Department Of Defense (DOD) activities, and their contractors. 
4.5.3. UCT Project Planner 
To facilitate the planning of projects, NFESC developed the UCT Project 
Planner.  This is a Microsoft Access database that ties the steps involved in 
the planning of projects together.  The personnel of the UCTs like the 
Project Planner, but there are some problems with it.  The largest issue is 
compatibility.  The UCT PP was written in Access 97.  The Navy has since 
upgraded all of its computer software to Office 2000, which includes MS 
Access 2000.  Unfortunately Access 2000 cannot read databases created in 
Access 97.  In short, the UCT PP is useless to the Teams right now.  This 
creates an opportunity, however.  As discussed in Chapter 3, a set of tools 
that would help the project planners analyze the risks associated with a 
task and give them immediate access to the lessons learned and 
documented best practices would be most beneficial.  The fact that the 
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UCT PP is currently not compatible allows an opportunity to add features 
to it as it is revised.  How we do this will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.6. Environment 
It would be easier to define where the UCTs do not dive than where they 
do.  Their diving mission takes them from the equator to the arctic and 
around the world.  They dive deep sea and high altitude fresh water.  
They must also be prepared to dive in any kind of weather day or night.  
Additionally, they must be prepared to perform their mission in a foreign 
country during wartime or in a remote area with limited support.  In 
performing their mission they could operate as independent details, 
augment or support other units or deploy as an integral UCT. 
Suffice it to say, the Underwater Construction Teams have a number of 
Potential Operating Environments for which they must be prepared.  
4.7. Interfaces   
The potential interfaces when discussing a command like this are infinite.  
The environment can have an impact on the equipment need to do the job, 
the procedures they use and how the dive team is organized.  A change in 
mission could mean a change in procedures which could affect the tools 
and equipment needed to do the job.  Since a good deal of the UCT 
funding depends on the mission, the better the information that goes up 
the Chain-of-Command, the better the chances the Teams will receive the 
funding they need.  This funding can come in the form of procurement of 
missing or broken items in the TOA or for research and development of 
new items to enhance mission performance.   
 
One of the most significant interfaces however, is that of the job the Teams 
have to do and the environment and method by which they have to do it.  
Construction itself is traditionally a dangerous business.  Research shows 
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that around 40% of high consequence accidents are due to errors in 
construction (Bea, 2001).  Considering the seven elements of the 
Engineered system, and the potential things that could go wrong, it is not 
hard to understand why construction is so dangerous.  Now compound 
the problem by performing the construction tasks underwater.  Now there 
is one complicated Engineered system being used to work on another 
complicated system.      
4.8. Summary 
The Underwater Construction Teams are a highly skilled group of SEABEE 
Divers.  They have a large number of required capabilities and a large 
number of environments in which all those capabilities must be 
employed.  These ROCs and POEs are set forth by the CNO.  They not 
only have a construction and diving mission but they have a combat 
mission as well.  Their operational tempo is fast and furious yet they are 
significantly undermanned.  They execute their mission by means of the 
deployment cycle, which consists of a maintenance phase, a training phase 
and a deployment phase.  The deployment phase is where the most 
valuable lessons are learned on how to execute construction, inspection, 
maintenance, and repair projects.  The UCTs are supported through 
various entities in the chain of command.  Decisions on funding for the 
UCTs are made based on the information that makes it up the chain.   
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5. Knowledge Management 
As mentioned earlier, the tools necessary to capture what we have learned, 
store the information and access that information for future use are currently 
not available.  The theories of Knowledge Management, however, provide a 
framework in which a robust system can be built that will allow commands 
to capture what they know.  This chapter is provided to give some 
background into Knowledge Management.  For further more detailed 
information, the reader is encouraged to look at 
www.FoundationKnowledge.com under e-learning and the Department of 
the Navy's Knowledge-Centric Organization Toolkit as these are valuable 
sources of information on the subject. 
 
5.1. Definitions 
The following definitions are from leaders in the field of Knowledge 
management and can be found on the Department of the Navy's 
Knowledge-Centric Organization Toolkit: 
 
• "The acquisition, sharing and use of knowledge within organizations, 
including learning processes and management information systems" 
 
• "…Embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic 
combination of data and information processing capacity of 
information technologies, and the creative and innovative capacity of 
human beings" 
 
• "Creation, acquisition and transfer of knowledge and modification of 
organizational behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights" 
 
• "Finding out how and why information users think, what they know 
about the things they know, the knowledge and attitudes they possess, 
and the decisions they make when interacting with others" 
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• "Getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time so 
they can make the best decision" 
 
5.1.1. The "Springboard Story" 
Each organization that puts the theories of Knowledge Management into 
practice has their own definition of what Knowledge Management is.  
These definitions may mean something to the organizations that 
developed them, but they do not fully answer the question, "What is 
Knowledge Management?"   Stephen Denning in his book, The 
Springboard Story, uses stories to illustrate the meaning of Knowledge 
Management.  In an attempt to illustrate what knowledge management, 
here are two stories to consider.  The first is without knowledge 
management and the second is with knowledge management. 
 
Without Knowledge Management: 
Air Det Charlie of Underwater Construction Team Two is tasked with 
sealing the entrance of a tunnel 120' below the surface for a dam in a lake 
in the Rock Mountains.  The work involves installing two bulkheads each 
weighing 12000 pounds.  UCT 2 has done a project like this before, but it 
was years ago.  A number of the personnel involved in the job have been 
promoted and moved on to other jobs and are currently not available to 
assist in the planning.  Some of the others are still in the command, but are 
deployed with Air Det Bravo.  Still others are in a shore billet at UCT 2, 
but are so tied up in their job to plan the training for Air Det Alfa or 
sorting out the logistics for Air Det Charlie that they cannot devote the 
time to fill in the details on that job.  In both cases, their memory of the job 
is hazy.  After all, the Det does about six jobs on a deployment and there 
were three more deployments after that one.  Also, the details of each job 
start to fade with time.  The ones that do remember, remember that two 
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divers almost died on that project and there was some quick thinking 
done to save their lives.  They remember that there was something wrong 
with the seal of the bulkheads so they needed to remove and rework the 
gates.  There were poor lockout/tag-out procedures and that a piece of 
equipment fell of the working vessel, but that was it.  What could have 
been done to keep the seals from fouling in the first place?  What were the 
circumstances that lead to the near miss?  How was the deck of the surface 
vessel configured?  What were some of the considerations diving at such a 
high altitude?  All these questions are asked and answered through 
incomplete memory of the situation and do little to help Air Det Charlie 
plan for the new job.  They plan the job on their own and inevitably make 
and relearn the same issues that were learned by UCT 2 years before. 
 
With knowledge Management: 
Air Det Charlie of Underwater Construction Team Two is tasked with 
sealing the entrance of a tunnel 120' below the surface for a dam in a lake 
in the Rock Mountains.  The work involves installing two bulkheads each 
weighing 12000 pounds.  UCT 2 has done a project like this before, but it 
was years ago.  This doesn't matter though because the experiences of the 
last job are well documented and easily retrieved from the Underwater 
Construction Team database.  This is a web-based asset that collects 
lessons learned and best practices from UCT One, UCT Two and the 
Ocean Engineering Department at NFESC.   
 
There were some problems on the job the last time with some fouled J-
seals.  Having been asked to help design the job for the Det, Gene the 
Engineer refers to the database and recognized the problem with the 
installation.  Gene, now cognizant of the problem, has come up with a 
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design that will facilitate installation at the depth and conditions at which 
the Det will be working.   
 
There were a number of things that went wrong last time UCT 2 did this 
job.  There were some poor lock-out/tag-out procedures, poor 
communication between the Det and the civilian contractor on site, and 
some lessons learned about securing equipment to the deck of the 
working vessel.  All these issues were identified and addressed during the 
execution of the project and were stored in the database so they are not 
tainted by fading memories.  Additionally, solutions to the problems 
encountered were developed during the after action review and stored in 
the database for future reference.   
 
Finally, the Det knows there have been advances in high altitude diving, 
but does not have the latest guidance.  One of the Petty Officers sends out 
an e-mail to the Community of Practice to see what the community knows 
on the subject.  In a matter of two days he hears back from someone at 
UCT 1 who had just executed a job in the Appalachian Mountains.  He 
also receives an e-mail from the Navy's Experimental Dive Unit on their 
latest research.   
 
As a result of the input years before and the instant connectivity with 
other members within the community, Det Charlie is now out in front of 
some of the risks UCT 2 had faced in the past and is able to implement 
controls to mitigate these risks.   
  
Both of these stories are based on truth.  UCT TWO did in fact have a 
project in Lake Abiquiu, New Mexico in which a number of things went 
wrong.  The full article is enclosed in Appendix C.  A short time later, the 
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team did a similar job on the Green Mountain Project in Colorado.  
Because the projects were so close together, the Team was able to foresee a 
number of the risks and put well thought out controls in place to mitigate 
the risk involved.  LCDR Pickrell, the Commanding Officer of UCT 2 at 
that time, indicated that the problem went off with out a problem, but 
admits if the project were done a number of years down the road many of 
the same mistakes may have been made over again.  This is not to say the 
results would have been the same.  They could have been better or they 
could have been worse.   
5.2. How does one manage knowledge? 
In their White Paper, Program Management 2000: Know the Way, LTC 
George Cho (USAF), LTC Hans Jerrell (USAF), CAPT William Landay 
(USN) answer the question this way: 
 
You manage knowledge by developing a framework or system that 
enables organizations to capture, analyze, share, apply, and reuse 
knowledge to make better, faster, and smarter decisions across 
geographic, functional, and team boundaries. 
 
Depending on the product or service that a particular organization 
provides will depend on how they manage knowledge. To effectively 
manage knowledge for an organization it is important to determine what 
the goal is in collecting knowledge in the first place.  Karla Odell in her 
book "If Only We Knew What We Know" cites three "value propositions" 
that indicate where the best results could be obtained from implementing 
a Knowledge Management initiative.  These are as follows: 
 
Customer Intimacy - Focus is on capturing knowledge about customers, 
developing and transferring knowledge and understanding of customers 
needs preferences, and business to increase sales, as well as bringing 
knowledge of the organization to bear on customer problems. 
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Product-to-Market excellence - Focus is on reducing time-to-market, and 
designing and commercializing new products more quickly and 
successfully to increase revenue, retain market lead and grow profit 
margins. 
 
Achieving Operational Excellence - Focus is on the transfer of operational 
processes and know-how from top-performing units and processes to less-
well-performing units, ultimately improving the organization's overall 
performance. 
5.3. The US Navy's Philosophy 
The Department of the Navy's Definition is: 
 
Knowledge Management can be viewed as a process for optimizing 
the effective application of intellectual capital to achieve 
organizational objectives. 
 
Intellectual Capital is the summation of the human capital, the social 
capital and the corporate capital of an organization (Figure 7).   
  
Tacit Knowledge is defined is that knowledge that a person has acquired 
over time in the performance of his job.  Explicit knowledge is information 
that is kept in manuals - sort of a set of directions on how to accomplish a 
task.  Driving a car is a good example of what is meant by tacit and 
explicit knowledge.  One can read a manual on how to operate and drive a 
car. Step one: Put the key in the ignition.  Step two: With right foot on the 
break and left foot on the clutch, turn the key clockwise until the motor 
Figure 7 - Intellectual Capital 
Intellectual Capital = 
Human Capital (expertise, experience, capability, capacity, creativity)  
+ 
Social Capital (Networks, relationships, interactions, language) 
+ 







catches and release.  Etc.  While these explicit directions would in fact 
allow a person to drive the car, it would probably not be safe to be on the 
road or in the car.  Tacit knowledge is how most people operate a car.  A 
number of things are done without even thinking about it.  It is difficult to 
pass tacit knowledge on to others or to make tacit knowledge explicit. 
 
Looking back at Figures 5 and 6 in Chapter Two, the cognitive processes 
are defined as knowledge, rule and skill based behavior.  Knowledge 
based behavior in the context of tacit and explicit knowledge would be 
considered explicit while skill based behavior would be considered tacit.  
Webster's defines knowledge as "the fact or condition of knowing 
something with familiarity gained through experience or association or, 
acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art, or technique."  For 
this reason instead of "knowledge Based Behavior," "Information" or 
"Data" Based Behavior would be more appropriate.   Despite the 
terminology, explicit knowledge made tacit will increase an individual's 
reliability of performance in their job thereby increasing the quality of the 
finished product. 
 
LTC George Cho (USAF), LTC Hans Jerrell (USAF), CAPT William 
Landay (USN) cite people, processes, and technology as the cornerstones 
of any KM framework or system.  Building on this idea the Department of 
the Navy's Chief Information Officer (DONCIO) has developed "a model 
to serve as the framework for knowledge management projects 





 It is important to understand that each of these components cannot be 
emphasized at the expense of another.  If the processes or the technology 
are in place, but the culture of an organization is such that sharing 
knowledge is not a priority, the efforts will be for nothing.  
5.3.1. Culture 
While all five spokes of the wheel are necessary to the success of the 
Knowledge Management initiative, culture may be the most important.  
Unfortunately, culture is the most difficult to change.  Culture is about the 
people up and down the Chain-of-Command and across organizational 
boundaries.  If the culture is one that people feel they need to hoard 
knowledge to receive a promotion or a more superior evaluation than 
their peers, knowledge sharing will never happen.  On the other hand if 































the culture is one that encourages the collecting and sharing knowledge 
through relationships developed on trust, then the only thing to do is 
work to facilitate the process.  O'dell offers a few items to consider in 
building a culture based on sharing.  These are: 
1. Believe people want to share - She points out that people want to see 
their knowledge and expertise used; they want to learn from their 
colleagues, and; they want to learn form those that they trust and 
respect. 
2. Prepare to Lead by doing - If a knowledge sharing culture is the 
goal, then the leadership has to be out in front.  This means the 
leaders must contribute to the knowledge base and stress the 
importance of others to share as well.  This may mean establishing 
awards and incentives for those who do share. 
3.  Develop Collaborative relationships - This involves the 
establishment of Communities of Practice.  These communities are 
made up of people that share a passion for a particular topic.  They 
don't just come from one part of the organization, but stretch across 
the boundaries of the organization.  The Community of Practice 
brings the entire organization's resources to bear on a problem not 
just the local organization. 
4. Instill personal responsibility for knowledge creation - People are at 
the core of the knowledge management initiative.  They need to feel 
the responsibility to seek out knowledge from the knowledge 
network and add to it when they have something to offer. 
5. Create a collective sense of purpose. - The knowledge management 
initiative needs to have a purpose.  Sharing knowledge without a 
focus will lead the initiative astray.  Everyone has to be working 




There is a tendency to confuse Knowledge Management with Information 
Technology.  Information Technology facilitates the Knowledge 
Management initiative. The goal is to not just connect people to 
information, but to connect people to people. The idea is to have a virtual, 
collaborative website that facilitates sharing.  Odell offers the following 
examples of how technology can facilitate knowledge sharing:  
  
1. Structure document repositories - These are databases that have 
"structured content consisting of regular, alphanumeric data. 
2. Document exchange - These are documents, presentations, etc that 
contain information that can be used by others in the future. 
3. Discussion threads - These are discussion groups that connect 
members of the communities of practice. 
4. Pointers to expertise -  These are lists of people and their contact 
information that are recognized experts in particular fields. 
Technology also involves making sure the system is up to date and serves 
the intended purpose of the knowledge management initiative. 
5.3.3. Learning 
Data leads to information, which leads to knowledge.  To create 
knowledge, information must be backed up with the context in which it 
was created.  The person that is searching the knowledge base will then 
add his own context and create new knowledge. 
 
The collaboration point needs to be set up to facilitate the learning 
process.  Everybody learns in a different way.  Some people are visual and 
need videos and pictures, where others want to talk to an expert, still 
others want to read explicit knowledge and internalize it.  To this end, 
each of these methods must be included in the collaborative web site. 
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5.3.4. Process 
Odell points out that the most effective means of collecting knowledge is 
when it is done while actually doing one's job.  Making sure the 
Knowledge Management initiative lines up with the focus of the 
organization is the key to figuring out how to collect Best Practices and 
Lessons Learned.   
 
The "process" of collecting, reviewing and storing content for fast retrieval 
when needed is complicated.  Because the strength of the knowledge 
management initiative is in its ability to stretch across organizational 
boundaries, accountability needs to be assigned to members of the 
community for specific roles.  Who will work on collection?  Who will 
work on making sure the technology is the most current?  Who will 
review new content and weed out outdated material?  The roles go on. 
5.3.5. Content 
The people that will turn to the Knowledge base will want to know that 
the information contained in it is the most relevant available.  To this end 
a formalized content review process must be developed.  They need to 
trust that the content is accurate, relevant and timely.   
5.4. NAVFAC's solution 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command's Chief Engineer has started to 
implement Knowledge Management theories within NAVFAC.  As 
NAVFAC's workforce grows older and retires, there is an increasingly 
large potential to lose a great deal of human capital.  A report called 
"Sailor 21: A Research Vision to Attract, Retain, and Utilize the 21st 
Century Sailor" by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center 
in San Diego illustrates the effect this has in the following statement: 
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Today, Navy M&P [Manpower and Personnel] organizations are faced 
with a persistent loss of knowledge accumulated by their staffs. 
Continuous turnover of uniformed personnel results in a devastating 
erosion of expertise and corporate knowledge of the business functions 
that support the Navy's M&P processes. Many of these functions 
require extensive knowledge and analytical ability gained only from 
years of experience working in the functional area. Without this core 
knowledge and the benefit of past trial and error, process managers 
make uninformed and sometimes costly decisions. 
 
While this statement was made considering Personnel Management, its 
message rings true for NAVFAC as well.  NAVFAC is therefore starting to 
implement Knowledge Management principles into the organization.  
  
5.4.1. Organization of NAVFAC's Knowledge Management Initiative 
The Organization is divided up into five Chief Technical Engineers and is 
then divided into Technical Disciplines.  This is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Each of these Technical Disciplines is further sub-divided into Technical 
Centers of Expertise (TCE).  These TCEs exist through out the NAVFAC 
Figure 9 - NAVFAC's Engineering Network 
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organization and are located at the different Engineering Field Divisions, 
Public Works Centers and the Engineering Service Center.   
5.4.2. Culture 
The Knowledge Management initiative is relatively new at NAVFAC, but 
the seeds are being sewn in fertile ground.  Having lived through "do 
more with less," many of the senior leaders, civilian and military, have 
recognized the need to reach across the organization to look for answers.  
How to achieve this level of operation is a concern.  Knowledge 
Management provides the framework to make the reaching easier.  It is 
not hard to imagine Communities of Practice developing around the 
world as people begin to see the power of a Knowledge Centric 
Organization. 
 
The problem right now is that many people are still tying to understand 
what knowledge management is.  Total quality came under a great deal of 
scrutiny primarily because people tried to implement it without fully 
understanding it.  As a result, it didn't really take.  Care needs to be taken 
that the same thing does not happen to the Knowledge Management 
initiative.    
5.4.3. Technology 
NAVFAC has connected across the organization via the Engineering 
Network (E-Net) and Foundation Knowledge.com.  The purpose is to 
leverage the expertise in each of these technical disciplines across the 
organization.   The purpose of these two tools is for the exchange of 
knowledge.  It is a place to find Lessons Learned & Best Practices and 
establish collaboration threads.  Collaboration threads are e-mails that are 
"threaded together" on topics someone could be searching for information.  
There is also a tool to post documents that can be used across the 
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organization.  E-Net is not publicly accessible where Foundation 
Knowledge (www.FoundationKnowledge.com) is.  The vision of 
foundation knowledge is to be a "Knowledge Management Starter kit" and 
a basis for collaboration between DOD, federal Agencies, Private Sector 
Professionals and Academia. 
 
5.4.4. Learning 
There has been a great deal of effort to capitalize on the efforts of the Navy 
as a whole and other Communities of Practice with in the Navy.  
NAVSEA has developed a Guide for Communities of Practice that 
NAVFAC is using.  They have also tried to appeal to the different learning 
style of people as well. 
5.4.5. Process 
The process of capturing tacit knowledge and making it explicit varies 
from one Technical Discipline to another.  One example is the Knowledge 
Exchange Input form.  This is a web-based form that a contributor to the 
Knowledge Base uses to submit a Best Practice or Lesson Learned.  This is 
a great method and an easy way to collect Best Practices, but it requires 
that: 
1. The person know about the community of practice 
2. The person feels that he has something worth sharing, 
3. The Person is willing to contribute. 
The process of collecting BP/LL is still under development with in 
NAVFAC.  
5.4.6. Content 
Members of the Community of Practice for a particular Center of 
Expertise are encouraged to submit Best Practices and Lessons Learned to 
the knowledge base. The submissions are sent to the Technical Discipline 
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Leader who either reviews the document himself or forwards it to the 
appropriate Technical Center(s) of expertise.  Once the TCE(s) have 
reviewed the document it is e-mailed back to the TDL who either posts it 
in a searchable database or, if it does not add value to the knowledge base, 
in a non-searchable database. 
5.5. Summary 
Knowledge Management provides the framework from which a robust 
methodology of leveraging Intellectual Capital (Human + Social + 
Corporate) across an organization by means of the effective use of 
Information technology.  Knowledge Management provides benefits to 
the individual through enhanced job performance, a way to collaborate 
with others and a more effective way to learn a new task.  Knowledge 
Management provides advantages to the organization by enhanced 
mission performance, improving decision making, facilitating accessibility 
to expertise within the organization, promotes process improvement and 
reducing duplication of effort. (DON KCO Toolkit)  
 
However, because Knowledge Management is a relatively new business 
strategy, it is still in the first stages of development at NAVFAC.  Many of 
the more senior officers and civilians are aware of knowledge 
management, but have yet to get their arms around its potential.  Many of 
the key players that will be involved at the Centers of Expertise level are 
just beginning to learn what their roles will be.  While implementation is 
planned at the top of the organization, how to implement it at the 
operational level is just getting underway.   
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6. Risk Management through Knowledge Management 
Before starting this section, consider what has been covered so far.  Human 
and Organizational Factors contribute to 80% of the high consequence 
accidents (Bea, 2001).  To increase the reliability and subsequently the quality 
of a facility throughout its lifecycle, it is necessary to mitigate the risks 
attributed to human and organizational factors inherent in designing, 
constructing, maintaining, repairing and decommissioning a facility.  Using a 
systematic approach (such as ORM) to identify these potential hazards and 
implement controls to mitigate them is a good start, but may not be enough.  
To more thoroughly understand the risks in upcoming projects, the planner 
must study similar past projects to understand which controls worked and 
which did not work.  How can this be done effectively? The philosophy of 
Knowledge Management properly applied can work toward answering this 
question.   
 
In an effort to learn from the mistakes of the past, this chapter starts off with 
a discussion of why Knowledge Management fails in organizations and 
offers some items for consideration during implementation.  The “value 
proposition” (Section 5.2) for the UCTs is offered based on the information 
provided in Chapter 4.  The report gets more specific by looking at the 
“Process Function”(Section 5.3.4) of collecting knowledge when the tool for 
assessing risks and collecting BP/LL regarding risks is introduced.  The 
recognition of the need for a more complete revision of the UCT Project 
Planner is made based on the UCT operators’ definitions of risk and quality.  
The focus turns to Knowledge Management on the whole again then 
becomes wider as the content review and storage processes are discussed as 
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well as the need for the other four spokes of the wheel (Technology, Culture, 
Learning and Content) are identified. 
 
Some assumptions are made regarding Technology, Culture, Learning and 
Content based on the research done regarding the Underwater Construction 
Teams and, to a lesser degree, the Ocean Facilities Program.  This is an 
important point.  These assumptions are those of one person that is not yet 
part of the Underwater Construction Community of Practice (UC CoP).  
These assumptions should be questioned throughout the UC CoP before 
following the recommendations.  For a different Community of Practice, 
these assumptions should be challenged without question. As Knowledge 
Management is being implemented across the Navy and NAVFAC, it is 
important to consider how it is implemented at the operational level.  Some 
entities will see the value of implementing Knowledge Management while 
others will be less receptive.  For this reason, each entity must be studied 
individually to see where they fall on the scale of acceptability of new ideas 
6.1. Implementation Considerations 
The following are some issues to consider when implementing the 
program.  These are relevant regardless of the Community of Practice. 
6.1.1. Why Knowledge Management Fails 
When considering the implementation of a new program it is important to 
consider the potential obstacles (risks) that may keep the program from 
succeeding and then mitigate those risks. LTC Cho (USAF), LTC Jerrell 
(USAF), CAPT Landay (USN) cite categorize the obstacles to successful 





Commitment - Management needs to be fully involved in the Knowledge 
Management effort.  If this process is not stressed and lived by the boss, it 
will not be important for the operators.  The operators also need to know 
that there is something in it for them. 
 
Culture - If the culture of an organization is one that does not encourage 
sharing or promotes a culture where it is disadvantageous to share, the 
knowledge management program is over before it gets started. 
 
Capability - The organization must have good implementation skills.  This 
involves not only collecting content, but making it available to a person 
when and where they need it. 
 
Buzzwords – Using buzzwords send the message that Knowledge 
Management is the Chain of Command's management flavor of the day.  
The program will not get the support, because the operators will feel that 
if they wait it out long enough, "this too shall pass." 
 
Process 
The Knowledge Management program must start with a vision of what 
the organization will look like when the project is up and running.  Once 
the vision is developed by the organization, steps need to be developed to 
get there.  Metrics must also be developed to ensure that the desired 
results are being achieved and that the program is worth the effort. 
 
If sharing what one knows or being part of a Community of Practice is one 
more thing on the To-do list, people will not participate willingly.  The 
implementation needs to happen in a way that makes life easier and 
shows a benefit early on. One of the main reasons that people don't share 
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information is that there is not a system set up that will facilitate the 
process.  If the system can be set up in a way that will make their life 




If the technology being used for the program is too difficult or is 
insufficient to achieve what is hoped for the Knowledge Management 
effort will be a losing one as well. 
6.1.2. High Reliability Organizations 
It would also be worth reexamining the traits of High Reliability 
Organizations studied by Bea and Roberts and outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Redundancy - The system is developed throughout the community of 
practice.  Instead of one or two people understanding how to perform a 
task, now people across the Community of Practice can learn from each 
other.   
 
Procedures and rules - The guidelines in which operations are run are 
clear, concise, and not overly complicated.  Also, these rules and 
procedures must be up to date.  The person that has gone to "the book" to 
find the answer needs to know that the information is the most up to date 
and reliable available.   
 
Training - Training is provided to the managers and operators to help 
them deal with normal, abnormal and unbelievable scenarios.  The system 
should be set up so that it can develop these different scenarios. 
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Appropriate awards and punishments - The awards system should be 
aligned with what the organization and the Community of Practice want 
to achieve.  
 
Management's ability to see the big picture - Management is continuously 
checking the heading of the organization to ensure its words (policy and 
procedures) and its actions (operations) are in line and heading in a safe 
and reliable direction.  This involves the implementation of metrics and 
continuously monitoring the heading of the Community of Practice. 
   
Preoccupation with failure - The system should help identify potential 
hazards and how to mitigate them.  Once a goal is established what are 
the obstacles that will keep that goal from being achieved 
   
Culture - The culture should be one in which emphasizes the importance 
of collecting what we know. 
 
Sensitivity to operations - The most valuable content will come from the 
people on the front lines.  The system needs to be developed with them in 
mind.  It needs to make their life easier and they have to see the benefits of 
participating. 
 
These issues should be kept in mind when developing the system. 
6.1.3. Navy Lessons Learned System 
The CNO has sanctioned the Navy Lesson Learned System (NLLS) and 
there is an OPNAV instruction guiding them.  This system is part of the 
Naval Warfare Development Center.  Obviously a centralized collection 
point of Lessons Learned is beneficial in developing warfare doctrine.  If 
the Navy already has a Lessons Learned System (NLLS) why reinvent the 
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wheel?  The answer is that the KM program is much more focused than 
the NLLS.  The detail of the BP/LL specifically for UCTs would be so fine 
that it would not hold relevance to others in the fleet. 
 
Accessibility is also a concern.  To access the Lessons Learned directly a 
Secret line is needed.  Only one of the Teams has this line and there is only 
one of them in the command.  The NLLS also sends CD-ROMs to 
commands, but getting access to them is difficult as they are locked in the 
classified material vault.  The author did get a copy of a CD of the 
unclassified Lessons Learned.  A review of this CD showed that the last 
Lessons Learned submitted by an Underwater Construction Team was 
1992.  The system may exist, but it is not being used. This is because the 
NLLS is not part of the business process of the UCTs, so even though they 
might submit BP/LL to the system they will probably never access them 
again. 
6.2. What do we want to know? 
Considering the three value propositions offered by Odell and cited in 
Chapter 5, Operational Excellence is the most appropriate for the 
Underwater Construction Teams.  Looking at the critical procedures 
(Maintenance, Training and Deployment) for the UCTs outlined in 
Chapter 4, the most critical of these would be the deployment execution 
phase.  Therefore, the goal of the Knowledge Management initiative for 
the UCTs would be to improve operational excellence during deployment. 
6.3. Risk Assessment Tool 
As outlined in Chapter 3, Risk Assessment and Management is critical to 
increase the reliability, quality and safety of a product or task.  The Navy 
and Marine Corps implemented Operational Risk Management as a 
means to control risk involved in operations.  Performing ORM can be a 
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burdensome administrative task.  To this end a database driven ORM 
analysis tool is a potential way to help decrease this burden.  A tool, 
however, must fit in with the people that will be using it.  The Underwater 
Construction Teams are the target users for the tool being introduced here. 
  
6.3.1. The Underwater Construction Team Project Planner 
The UCTs in the past have used an MS Access database driven program to 
plan their projects (Figure 10).  They do not currently use the program 
because the Navy has upgraded to MS Office 2000, which includes MS 
Access 2000, and the database is written in MS Access 97.  Access 97 and 
Access 2000 are not compatible.  The UCTs have expressed an interest in 
using the program, however.  It is a great way to manage the logistics of 
Figure 10 - Underwater Construction Team Project Planner 
Figure 11 - UCT PP Construction Activity Summary Sheet 
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planning a construction project.  Since the program will have to be 
upgraded, there could be a couple of additions to the software that will 
help the Operators Manage Risk and Capture Lessons Learned. 
The tool being proposed in this report is designed to fit in with the UCT 
Project Planner.  Having identified the Activities in the Construction 
Activity Summary Sheets (CASS Sheets, Figure 11) and their associated 
Hazards in Folder 6 (Figure 12), the operator can then press a button to 
perform an ORM analysis. 
6.3.2. The Proposed Tool 
Considering the ORM process Step One: Identify Hazards is complete.  
Step Two: Assess Hazards is next.  The interface to assess the Hazards is 
illustrated in Figure 13.  A mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis is 
used to determine the probability and severity of the Hazard.  Bea 
describes this as a process where "linguistic variables are translated into 
numerical variables."  Liberatore points out that "without sufficient and 
reliable human error databases, this approach offers the best method to 
assess the influence of human and organizational factors."  The scores are 
Figure 12 - UCT PP Activity Hazard Input Form 
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from 1 (most severe) to 7 (least severe).  The associated risk is then 
calculated between 1 and 49.  The grades are then converted t the Risk 
Assessment Code Matrix in the following way: 
 
Table 11 - Risk Score vs Risk Assessment Code 
 









The tool allows the planner to choose which activity to analyze and which 
hazard with in the activity.  The planner can also identify risk mitigation 
controls from this form, but this is not recommended.  The reason this is 
Figure 13 - Hazard Assessment Form 
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not recommended is because once all the hazards are identified and 
assessed, the tool will sort them according to the risk from most severe to 
least severe.  If the planning has to happen in a short time period, it is 
recommended to start with the most severe.  If time is spent mitigating 
lesser risk hazards, more severe risks may be missed. 
 
Step Three: Make Risk Decisions is illustrated in Figure 14.  The risks 
illustrated through this form appear in order of severity with the most 
severe first.  The form shows the severity and probability scores that were 
given, the calculated risk and the corresponding Risk Assessment Code.   
Based on the System Approach to managing risk, there is a section for 
each of the components of the system.  This is where the controls for the 
risk are written down (Figure 15 is an example).  Once this is complete, 
there is a button that allows the operator to go back and reassess the risk 
based on the controls that are to be implemented.  If the risk is considered 
Figure 14 - Hazard Mitigation Controls Form 
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acceptable, the operator can move on to the next risk.  If the risk 
outweighs the benefit, the operator can check the block to have the Chain  
of Command review the hazard and the suggested controls.  There is a 
report that can be generated with a list of all the hazards that need the 
Chain of Command's attention.  
 
While Step 4: Implement Controls and Step 5: Supervise are not something 
that can be included in the database, there is one more step that can be 
added.  Step 6: Mitigation Control Review (Figure 16) allows the planner 
to go back and review the controls that were suggested after the activity is 
complete.  The planner can indicate what happened, how well the controls 
worked or did not work and what would be the recommendation for the 
future.  While Step 6 is not part of the ORM process, it could possibly be 
the most important step in the process.   
Figure 15 - Sample of Input for controls relating to "operators" 
 71 
 
Once the entire project is complete, there is a database of all the activities, 
involved in the project, the controls to decrease the risk of those activity's 
inherent hazards and documentation if the controls worked and what 
could be done in the future to make the activity even safer.  If operators 
take the time to fully document this information, the next person to plan a 
job can benefit from the first person's experience.  If these are then 
extracted and reviewed and placed in a central database, then planners in 
other Dets or Teams can learn from these as well.  With two Underwater 
Construction Teams each with two operational Dets per year doing 
approximately six jobs each, the database would grow quickly in a short 
amount of time. 
Figure 16 - Sample control Review Input form for "Operators" 
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6.4. Collecting Best Practices and Lessons Learned 
6.4.1. Quality vs. Risk? 
This report has shown that risk and quality go hand-in-hand.  To increase 
the quality of a product it is necessary to increase the reliability, which 
translates into decreasing the risk.  The ORM tool, in theory, should work 
to improve the overall quality of a product.  Unfortunately, research has 
shown that many people do not consider risk and quality to be related.  
This was found to be true when visiting the Underwater Construction 
Teams.  Quality is seen as the outcome of a task and the method by which 
it was completed, where risk is seen as the potential danger that could 
result in performing the task.  Mitigation of risk is to improve the safety of 
the task while the resulting quality is a separate issue. 
6.4.2. Best Practices and Lessons Learned 
Lessons Learned imply that a project was planned a certain way and did 
not go as planned resulting in something being learned.  This learned item 
will be taken into consideration the next time the task is performed to 
increase the success rate.  What about the plans that work, though?  Best 
Practices are very rarely documented for future implementation. 
 
So, while collecting a repository of Lessons Learned regarding risk is 
useful, it will be incomplete.  There needs to be a way to collect Lessons 
Learned and Best Practices not only in the mitigation of risk, but also in 
the performance of tasks and their impact on the overall quality 
(compatibility, durability, safety and serviceability) of the end product.  
 
The current method of collecting Lessons Learned and to a lesser extent 
Best Practices is to wait until the end of a deployment.  At the end of a 
deployment, however, many of the subtleties involved in the lesson being 
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learned are lost.  Once the subtleties are lost, the context in which the 
lesson was learned is forgotten and it no longer holds the power that it did 
at the time it was learned.  If the goal is to build a repository of 
meaningful information, the Lessons Learned and Best Practices must be 
documented as they occur.  So, how can this be done? 
6.4.3. Real Time Collection of BPLL 
The strength of the proposed tool is that while the operators are doing 
their job of planning work accomplishment and mitigating risk, they are 
concurrently building a repository of Lessons Learned.  The important 
part of this is, "while doing their job."  As mentioned earlier, the UCTs' 
operational tempo while deployed is high.  If documentation of Best 
Practices and Lessons Learned (BPLL) is considered an additional thing to 
do, it most likely will not get done.  The answer is to make the collection 
of BPLL a part of the job.  This requires a couple of changes to how 
business is currently conducted:   
 
1.   The Chain of Command must include BPLL as part of the bi-weekly 
reporting requirements. 
2. Reporting of BPLL must fit naturally into the reporting process. 
3. The reporting process needs to become easier. 
 
The Project Planner can be configured so that the operators can, with 
minimal effort, input information, including BPLL, on a daily basis.  The 
information collected by the database is used to generate the bi-weekly 
Situation Report that is required by the Chain of Command.  While 
collecting BPLL other than those associated with risk is beyond the scope 
of this project, recommendations as to how this could be accomplished 
and what the benefits would be are included in Chapter 7.   
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6.4.4. After Action Review 
The US Army has implemented a method of collecting Best Practices and 
Lessons Learned after an exercise.  The After Action Review (AAR) gets 
all the people involved in the exercise, junior and senior, together to give a 
run down of what went right and what went wrong and what could be 
done in the future to improve.  The reviews are run in such a way that all 
member’s insights and opinions are valued, not jut those of the leadership.  
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has representatives at these 
reviews when they happen on major exercises or operations.  The 
representatives from CALL document what was said during the review 
and then add context to it.  Those involved in the exercise, to ensure it 
accurately reflects what was learned, review the content of what was 
documented.  Once checked, the information is posted Army wide and is 
retrievable the next time an operation is conducted. 
 
The UCTs could implement this process as well albeit to a lesser degree.  It 
would be beneficial to do this at the completion of the projects on 
deployment, but the operational tempo may preclude that from 
happening.  In this case the Chain of Command could give the returning 
Det time to do an AAR and identify and document the items that worked 
and did not work. 
6.5. Content Considerations 
6.5.1. Content Review Process 
Now that the Best Practices and Lessons Learned have been collected they 
need to be reviewed.  Some of what will be documented will not be  
relevant to the entire community while other issues may not be a good 
practice to include.  Still others may need more clarification.  A formal 
review process then needs to be established to ensure that the Lessons 
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Learned are worth sharing the Best Practices are, in fact, best.  The flow 
chart is in Appendix D. 
 
The review process takes advantage of the Underwater Construction 
Community of Practice.  Dr. Phil Vitale, the Deputy Director of the Ocean 
Facilities Program and Leader of the Technical Center of Expertise for 
Underwater Construction reviews the BPLL generated by the Dets and 
screened by the respective Team's Operations Department.  He can review 
the document himself and/or send it to other TCE(s) (i.e. Underwater 
Inspection) for their review.  Once the BPLL is clarified, it can be 
forwarded to the Technical Discipline Leader at NFESC Code 50, Mr. Mike 
Atturio.  Once cleared through Code 50, the BPLL is loaded into the 
repository in the appropriate area so it can be easily retrieved in the 
future. 
6.5.2. Storage 
How the BPLL are stored is an important consideration for getting the 
relevant information to the user when they need it.  As stated earlier, the 
Underwater Construction Teams refer to the NAVFAC P-990 
Conventional Underwater Repair Techniques Manual for their job.  A 
proposed storage taxonomy is to use the Table of Contents of this manual.  
The P-990 reflects the mission of the Underwater Construction Teams and 
includes a great deal of valuable information.  Also many of the operators 
are familiar with the lay out of the P-990 so would be better able to find 
what they were looking for. 
 
The documents would be posted with a description underneath that 
would contain "key words" that would be referenced if one were 
searching by means of a search engine.  The key words are important 
because, sometimes an entry under one category may have relevance in 
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another category.  For instance, a certain hydraulic tool may not work well 
in extremely Arctic conditions.  This LL would be filed under the section 
in the P-990 that relates to that particular tool.  If an operator conducts a 
search using the key word arctic, and the entry for that tool has the key 
word arctic, the operator will discover that that particular tool will be 
useless.  If there is no key word, the operator may miss that piece of 
information.  
6.5.3. Effects of Collecting good Content 
As the repository fills with useful content, there are some interesting items 
that could result. 
6.5.3.1. Changes to the P-990 
As certain tasks are performed and feedback is being made to the 
Technical Centers of Expertise, it may be discovered that what is currently 
in the P-990 is no longer relevant and that a new Best Practice may be 
more appropriate.  To this end the experience gained will provide the 
background to update the manual.  This is in fact the spirit in which the P-
990 was written to begin with. The introduction of the manual sums it up 
as follows: 
It is based on analysis of past UCT operations and equivalent 
commercial practice.  It is to be viewed as a living document, subject to 
continual revision and updating as new or improved equipment and 
work techniques are developed.  Feedback to the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Service Center of UCT Field Experience in using the 
techniques described herein, or modifications of these techniques, is 
strongly encouraged sot that all UCT personnel can benefit from the 
experience of the individual team members. 
 
That said, the system proposed would be fulfilling the intent of the 
manual's authors.  The process flow chart for this is seen in Appendix E. 
 
 77 
6.5.3.2. Need for improvement in Equipment 
Documentation of how the UCTs do on projects will also indicate where a 
new piece of equipment is needed or if an improvement to an existing 
piece of equipment is warranted.  An example of this would be the 
Bathymetric Land and Sea Survey system that the UCTs use for 
hydrographic reconnaissance.  The teams would use the BLASS system 
and report daily on the problems, if any, they encountered.  If these 
reports were collected in the appropriate area, the Engineers at NFESC 
would be in a better position to determine where the real problems lay.   
This is important given the financial constraints on NFESC to help the 
UCTs.  If there is a finite amount of money to spend, it is important that 
the issues being worked on are understood up front. 
 
The documentation could also indicate that a new piece of equipment is 
needed to better fulfill their mission.  Good documentation and 
operational examples of where the mission has suffered may not 
guarantee money to research, develop, test and evaluate new equipment, 
but it may improve the chances that money will become available. 
 
6.6. Web Site: Home of the Repository 
Now that the BPLL have been collected and the content has been reviewed 
and there is a method by which the information could be stored, it is time 
to consider where the repository will be stored.  In order for the 
information to be of benefit to the most people, it needs to be web based.  
The website has to be a point of collaboration for the entire Underwater 
Construction Community of Practice.  This needs to be the spot that the 
operators turn to first to find the answers they need to accomplish the 
mission.  In order for this to happen, the operators must know that they 
will be able to find what they are looking for.  This means that the 
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information has to be the most relevant and current available.  It also 
means that if the information is not there that they will be able to find 
someone that could provide the information they are looking for.  What 
more, this means that people must willingly want to contribute to the 
Community of Practice.    
 
As mentioned earlier, NAVFAC has developed the Engineering Network 
(E-Net) on the NAVFAC Intranet.  At present, the UCTs, NFESC and the 
Ocean Facilities Program all have their own web sites.  In fact they have at 
least two.  Ideally the UC CoP would have one website on the E-Net from 
which all the members of the community work.  This would be the 
“virtual meeting place” where the operators could go to find answers to 
questions from other operators.   
 
While the E-Net would be the place to establish the UC CoP website, there 
would also be a need for a publicly accessible site as well.  This would be 
the place where members of the community could share with civilian 
organizations, former members of the UC CoP that are no longer in the 
military, and Civil Engineer Corps officers in the OFP pipeline at graduate 
school.  The OFP website as it currently exists is set up to connect the 
entire community.  There are lists of past and present OFP members and 
access to the Seabee Divers Association.  A web site set up like this, if not 
this site itself, would be an ideal place to encourage collaboration.   
 
6.6.1. Construct 
Taxonomy - How the web site is set up is important, as it will provide the 
map to navigate around the site.  The taxonomy proposed in section 6.5.2 
will be an effective way to organize the content.  Once the BPLL has made 
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it through the review process it would be posted by the Leader of the 
Technical Center of Expertise under the appropriate section.   
 
This taxonomy, however, only deals with the UCT operations.  As more 
operators start to contribute to and count on the web site, more 
information will be needed.  These items could include maintenance, 
training and logistics.  It is important to start with a narrow focus and, as 
the program gains momentum, be able to expand later. 
  
Search Engine - While a well documented taxonomy will help an operator 
find what they are looking for a search engine will help those that are not 
sure where to look for information. 
 
Threaded E-mails - A valuable feature the new technology has to offer is 
the use of threaded e-mails and/or discussion forums.  This is where a 
question could be posted or a new initiative introduced to the community 
for consideration and input.  All members of the community would be 
allowed to contribute insight to the issue.  All the different responses 
would be linked together.  This gives the initiative being proposed variety 
in perspective. 
6.6.2. Adding content 
The current technology allows adding content to the website very easy.  
The question that needs to be answered is who would be allowed to add 
content and to what extent.  For BPLL, only the Leader of the Technical 
Center of Expertise will be allowed to add content.  This ensures that the 
item has been thoroughly reviewed and is considered worthy of posting.   
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6.6.3. Security Considerations 
Serious thought needs to be given to the security of the system.  The 
Navy's Lessons Learned System goes to great lengths to ensure the 
security of the information is maintained.  The classified lessons are 
available from the Naval Warfare Development Command's Lessons 
Learned database, but this requires a secure data line.  They are also 
available on CD-Rom.  The CD is available via the Defense Courier 
Service.  Once obtained, the CD is locked in the command's vault.  Even 
the unclassified lessons are difficult to obtain.  While this does not 
promote the "free exchange of knowledge," it does maintain security.   
 
The question then has to be asked what is too much information to be 
posted on a publicly accessible site or even on NAVFAC's intranet site.  
The type of information that would be posted to the Community's web 
site is not necessarily classified (i.e. what is the best way to clean a pile on 
a pier in Hawaii), but it does give some indication to the capabilities of the 
unit.  A string of this type of lesson could paint more of a picture of what a 
unit can do or is about to do to a potential enemy.  
6.7. Summary 
There is a tendency to see a difference between risk and quality in the 
UCTs.  Quality is and attribute of the finished product where risk is seen 
as the potential dangers to the individual in completing the project.  If 
there is no danger in performing the task there is no risk, but there are 
quality concerns.  For this reason further work needs to be done to 
improve the UCT Project Planner to not only collect Best Practices and 
Lessons Learned regarding Operational Risk Management, but also 
regarding quality of the finished product.  The further development of the 
Project Planner  (which is a process function) cannot happen 
independently of the other aspects (Culture, Technology, Learning and 
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Content) of effective Knowledge Management.  The most important 
consideration is the formal establishment of the Underwater Construction 
Community of Practice.  Once people are brought together with a 
common interest for the purposes of improved communication and 
sharing of information, the questions surrounding the other elements of 




The best way to proactively manage risk is to have a more thorough 
understanding of the risks involved before beginning a task.  This 
understanding will be gained by studying the risks that were encountered on 
similar tasks in the past, how they were controlled and how effective the 
controls were.  Knowledge Management provides the philosophical base to 
implement a Knowledge Centric Organization that captures what is learned 
and leverages it across the organization.  This report deals with the process of 
collecting and storing best practices and lessons learned regarding risk. Just 
having a process in place to collect BPLL is not enough, though.  To 
effectively implement a KCO, the culture of the community must be one that 
is willing to share knowledge, the knowledge must stored in a way that 
facilitates learning, the techniques for collecting knowledge must fit in with 
how the organization does business.  To this end the following 
recommendations are made.  I strongly encourage those interested in 
implementing these items refer to the Department of the Navy Knowledge-
Centric Organization Toolkit.  Also the e-learning pages on 
www.foundationknowledge.com provide a great deal of information on 
knowledge management.  Success of the implementation depends on 
everyone involved understanding what is trying to be achieved and bringing 
their expertise and experience to bear. 
7.1. Formally Establish the Underwater Construction Community of 
Practice 
The most important item to be accomplished is the formal establishment 
of the Underwater Construction Community of Practice (UC CoP).  The 
UC CoP already exists, albeit informally.  It is made up of Seabee Divers, 
Ocean Facilities Program Officers and the civilian engineers at NFESC 
Code 50.  Getting these people together to discuss common items of 
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interest and bounce ideas off each other is the place to start.  To formalize 
the community it is necessary to bring the leadership of these three 
entities together and explain knowledge management and its role in 
leveraging BP/LL across the community.  The leadership then needs to 
make knowledge management a priority.  Getting the leadership on board 
is the first step in encouraging a culture that encourages sharing.  The 
leadership can be introduced to Knowledge Management at the annual 
UCT conference held in November and at the bi-annual OFP conference 
(next one is scheduled for May '02). 
 
Once the community is formed roles and responsibilities must be 
established to ensure the initiative takes root and grows.  Who will 
maintain the website? Who reviews content? Who will develop the 
taxonomy for the website for the ease of finding information?  How will 
security of the information be maintained?  These questions and many 
more must be answered.  The NAVSEA Community of Practice 
Practitioners Guide will be a valuable resource in implementing the 
Community of Practice. 
 
Other issues the community must address: 
• What is the organization’s value proposition?  This report suggests 
that it is operational excellence, but it could be customer intimacy or 
maybe it is both. 
• How to collect Best Practices and Lessons Learned? - A method to 
collect BP/LL is offered in this report.   
• What is the desired result of collecting BP/LL? - This report views 
operational excellence as the focus of the KM initiative. 
• What incentives will be used to get people to share? 
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• Who reviews content? - This report offers a proposed flow chart for 
content review. 
• Who maintains the collaborative website?  
• How will the community know the KM initiative is moving in the right 
direction?   
To this end, metrics should be used.  To help in establishing these 
metrics, the Department of the Navy's Chief Information Officer's 
"Metrics Guide for Knowledge Management Initiatives" is a great 
source of information. 
• Many more questions need to be addressed by the leadership and the 
Community of Practice. 
 
7.2. Develop a collaborative web site  
The Community must establish a collaborative website on the E-Net so 
that there is a central, virtual place to develop the community.  The 
members of the UC CoP are in many different commands across the 
country and around the world.  Not everyone will be able to make every 
meeting to provide insight into the development of the community. 
 
The website will be the place where ideas are introduced and discussed 
for the improvement of the community.  Most importantly, it will be the 
place where Best Practices and Lessons Learned are posted.  These will be 
the items that make the Community safer and more reliable in the future.  
As knowledge is passed from one operator to another and successes that 
result from the KCO emerge, the program will gain momentum.  
 
7.3. Fix the Project Planner 
If the focus of the Knowledge Management initiative is, in fact, improving 
operations then the UCT Project Planner is the tool that holds the key.  
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Not only can the Planner be configured to assess and manage risk, but it 
could also be used to capture Best Practices and Lessons Learned 
regarding quality of the finished product.   
 
If the Community is established and there is a virtual place to collaborate 
then there is a place to provide feedback regarding the improvements to 
the Planner.  The Project Planner needs to evolve continually.  As 
technology improves the power of the planner will increase.  The more 
people use it and see its value, the more they will want to use it to track 
additional information, such as training, maintenance of equipment and 
logistics.   
 
There will also be problems with the planner and bugs to be worked out.  
The communication between the developers of the planner and the users 
must be constant.  As developers make improvements, the users need to 
be made aware of the improvements.  If the users discover bugs, the 
problems need to be communicated to the developers.  To this end, a pre-
designed feedback system must be developed. 
 
7.4. Collect Lessons Learned and Best Practices from the files 
Both Underwater Construction Teams have paper files of many years of 
projects.  These files undoubtedly hold valuable information that could be 
filed in the knowledge base.  Once the UC CoP and the collaborative 
website are established and the content review process is in place, a 
contract could be let to go through the files and catalogue Best Practices 
and Lessons Learned.   
7.5. Establish ties with Academia to research initiatives 
Many of the students that go to graduate school through the Navy to 
become OFP officers, want to take on a project that will have some benefit 
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to the OFP and the Navy.  As new initiatives develop, these officers would 
be ideal to "flush out" the intricacies involved in the initiatives.  These 
students have access to leading experts in the field of Ocean Engineering 
and Construction Management.  They also have the time to focus on a 
particular issue where other members of the community have their 
regular job to do.  There are mutual benefits to this arrangement.  The 
community gets "free labor" to pursue the initiative and the student, who 
is now a new member of the community, gains an understanding of how 
the community operates and also feels like he is contributing to the 
community. 
7.6. Educate at NDSTC about repository 
If most of the valuable lessons will be learned from the operators then the 
operators need to be educated of the existence of the knowledge base as 
early as possible.  The place to do this is at the Underwater Construction 
School at the Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center.    The operators 
need to be educated not only on the power of the knowledge base in 
helping plan jobs, but also on the importance of contributing lessons 
learned. 
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8. The Next Step 
8.1. The Underwater Construction Community of Practice 
The first thing that needs to be done is to formally establish the UC CoP.  
This will not be difficult because it already exists.  The trick is to give the 
entire community something to work on together, in other words a pilot 
project.  A suggestion for the pilot is the revision of the UCT Project 
Planner.  A number of the operators have said that they would like to see 
the Planner revised so that it could be used in planning projects.  During 
the revision the items discussed in this paper could be considered as well 
as the application of knowledge management principles.  Such as a 
website where members of the community could collaborate on the 
improvement of the Project Planner.   
8.2. University of California, Berkeley 
The pilot project would make a great report topic for a graduate student.  
It will give them insight into the Ocean Facilities Program and the 
Underwater Construction Teams and indoctrinate them into the 
Community of Practice.  Additionally, the project will complement the 
work being done in Risk Assessment and Management of Marine Systems 
being done by Professor Bob Bea at the University.  The student should 
contact the Commanding Officers of the Underwater Construction Teams 
and the Assistant Director of the Ocean Facilities Program at the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Service Center’s East Coast Detachment to discuss 




To achieve consistently high quality in the lifecycle of facilities, it is 
necessary to mitigate the risks associated with the various stages of the 
lifecycle.  The most effective way to do this is to learn from the best 
practices developed and the lessons learned from past projects.  This 
report is primarily focused on the development of a tool to collect Best 
Practices and Lessons Learned regarding risk in the Underwater 
Construction Teams.  Research has indicated that risk and quality are, for 
the most part, viewed as mutually exclusive.  Therefore, if the goal is to 
maintain high quality in the lifecycle it is necessary to collect not only 
Lessons Learned regarding risk, but also Best Practices and Lessons 
Learned regarding quality. 
 
Just having a tool to collect BP/LL however is not enough.  The culture of 
the target organization has to be one that encourages one to seek out and 
contribute knowledge from and to the knowledge base.  There needs to be 
a process to put the information in a format that is retrievable when 
needed and stored in a place that is universally accessible. People need to 
trust that the information is the most relevant and up to date available.   
The information needs to be in a format that appeals to various learning 
styles. 
 
This report has tied together Risk Assessment and Management, 
specifically Operational Risk Management, and Knowledge Management 
in an effort to help mitigate risks associated with the operations of the 
Navy’s Underwater Construction Teams and increase quality.  
Recommendations are offered to implement a knowledge-based 
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community of practice in the UCTs and indicated the next steps toward 
implementation.  This process once started will never be finished.  The 
goal is continuous improvement in the communication between members 
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